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CyberLaw: A Brave New World
Richard A. Mann* and Barry S. Roberts**
Technology and business have frequently outpaced the law. In
today's business environment, the widening of this gap has
accelerated with the rapid growth of e-commerce and
communication on the Internet.1 The resulting legal vacuum has
not only created considerable uncertainty in business transactions,
but also created numerous opportunities for abuse. In this article
we will identify some of the types of legal and regulatory issues that
have arisen or are likely to arise. We will also describe the extent
to which the law has responded or is in the process of responding.
This article will cover the following areas of the law that have been
most significantly affected by e-commerce and the evolution of the
Internet: defamation, intellectual property, contract and sales law,
privacy, securities regulation, and cyber crime.
I. Defamation
A. The Elements
Defamation, whether in the "real" world or in "cyberspace,"
occurs when a false statement harms the reputation of another.2 In
* Professor of Business Law, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of
North Carolina, B.S. University of North Carolina, J.D. Yale Law School.
** Professor of Business Law, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of
North Carolina, B.S. Pennsylvania State University, J.D. University of
Pennsylvania School of Law, LL.M. Harvard Law School. The authors thank our
research assistant Michael O'Sullivan for his invaluable help on this project.
1. For example, between 1995 and 2000 the number of people online
quintupled. http://www.commerce.net/research/stats/wwwpop.html (last visited
May 10, 2001); http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big-picture/geographics/article/
0,,5911_594751,00.html (last visited May 10, 2001).
2. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 111, at 773-74 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the varying definitions of
defamation among different jurisdictions). See id. at 774-78 (providing examples
of defamatory statements and the circumstances surrounding a particular
statement that may make it defamatory).
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most jurisdictions, the elements of a defamation action include the
following: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another
person, and (2) an unprivileged publication (communication) to a
third party. Additionally, in some cases, depending on the "public"
or private status of the victim, a third element is required: some
degree of fault on her part in knowing or failing to ascertain the
falsity of the statement. Furthermore, in some cases, a fourth
element is required: proof of special harm caused by the
publication. Defamatory means causing injury to a person's
reputation by disgracing her and diminishing the respect within
which she is held.3 An example of a defamatory injury is publishing
a false statement that a person had committed a crime or had
committed an offensive act. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof
in a defamation action to prove the falsity of the statement. To
date, defamation by way of the Internet has been treated as libel'
rather than as slander,5 similar to the treatment of defamation by
way of radio and television.
One defamation issue, in both traditional media and
cyberspace, is the classification of a party as a publisher or
distributor.6 The distinction is key because a publisher, upon a
showing of the appropriate level of fault,7 may be held liable for a
defamatory statement, while a distributor may be held liable only if
it is shown that he knew or had reason to know of the defamatory
statement.8 Typically, the author is a publisher, as well as any other
party that exercised editorial control over the writing of the piece
or whose business it is to disseminate the piece.9 The most common
examples of the latter are newspapers, book publishers and
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (hereinafter RESTATEMENT) § 558
(1977). See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Article: Defamation, Reputation, and
the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1996) (evaluating the effectiveness
of the community standard when courts determine whether a statement is
defamatory).
4. Libel is generally written. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 771.
5. Slander is usually oral. See id. But see Sheri Hunter, Defamation and
Privacy Laws Face the Internet, 17 COMM. LAW. 16, n.1 (1999) (noting that further
technological advances may make slander a viable tort on the Internet).
6. The term distributor carries the same meaning as a secondary publisher or
secondary disseminator. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 803.
7. See, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (differentiating between
the actual malice requirement for public officials in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), later extended to public officials in Curtis Publ'g Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and a lesser standard for private persons).
8. Compare KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 811, with RESTATEMENT, supra
note 3, § 612, cmt. e (discussing the limits of a distributor's privilege to publish
known defamatory statements).
9. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 803, 810.
[Vol. 106:2
CYBERLAW: A BRAVE NEW WORLD
television stations.0 By contrast, those who do not participate in
the writing or editing of a defamatory statement but merely assist in
its distribution are considered distributors rather than publishers."
Libraries, newsstands, book stores and even paperboys are
examples of distributors. 12
B. Early Cases Involving ISP Liability
The first Internet defamation cases, Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc. and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co., focused on the liability of Internet Service Providers ("ISPs").
In 1990, plaintiffs claimed they were defamed in an online
newsletter known as Journalism Forum and sued CompuServe in
New York. 3 CompuServe provided Journalism Forum to its
Internet users through a contract with Cameron Communications
Inc., a company that agreed to exercise editorial control over the
Journalism Forum.4  However, CompuServe did not review
Journalism Forum's material before distributing the newsletter to
Internet users. 5 As a result, the court held that CompuServe was
not liable because it distributed Journalism Forum without
knowledge of its allegedly defamatory statements.
16
Several years later, another New York court addressed the
issue of ISP liability. A securities firm sued Prodigy, claiming it was
defamed after an anonymous user posted statements that the firm's
employees had engaged in fraud and were paid to lie. 7 The court
held that Prodigy acted as the publisher of an online financial
bulletin board. In distinguishing Prodigy from CompuServe, the
court found that Prodigy had held itself out as a family-oriented site
that exercised editorial control over posted messages. 9 The court
10. See id. at 803.
11. See id. at 803-04, 810-11.
12. See id. at 803.
13. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
14. See id. at 137.
15. See id. In addition, CompuServe did not enter into a contract with the
party providing the defamatory information appearing on the Journalism Forum.
16. See id. at 139 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), where the
Supreme Court struck down a state statute making it a crime for a shop owner to
distribute materials that he had not reviewed). "Every bookseller would be placed
under an obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his
shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so .. " Id. (quoting Smith,
361 U.S. at 153).
17. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995
WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
18. Id.
19. See id. at *5 (finding that Prodigy advertised that it controlled content, and
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compared Prodigy's editorial actions to those of a newspaper
publisher and concluded that Prodigy was liable to the plaintiff
because it acted as a publisher.0
C. Congress's Reaction: The Communications Decency Act of
1996
In response to the Stratton decision, Congress passed section
230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA")."'
Essentially reinstating the Cubby decision, this provision grants
ISPs immunity when publishing information originating from a
third party.22 The language of section 230 provides, in part, that
"[n]o provider.., shall be treated as the publisher.., of any
information provided by another information content provider."'
A literal interpretation of this language is that Congress intended
that ISPs could be liable as distributors where it is shown they knew
24or should have known of the defamatory content.
The CDA was first interpreted in Zeran v. American Online,
Inc.25 In 1995, a posting was made on an American Online, Inc
("AOL") bulletin board stating that the plaintiff, Kenneth Zeran,
was selling t-shirts that depicted "offensive and tasteless slogans"
regarding the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing.26 The
posting instructed potential purchasers to call the plaintiff,
that its software and employees screened posted messages).
20. See id. at *3 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) (holding that editorial decisions for newspaper publications heighten
the newspaper's liability for that content)).
21. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230
(1996)). See Barry J. Waldman, A Unified Approach to Cyber-libel: Defamation on
the Internet, a Suggested Approach, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (1999) at
http://www.richmond.edu /jolt/v6i2/notel.html (last visited May 10, 2001).
22. Though much of the CDA was later found unconstitutional, Section 230
remains in force. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that parts of
the CDA aimed at protecting minors from pornography violated free speech rights
embodied in the First Amendment).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996). An information content provider is defined
by the CDA as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service." See id. § 230(f)(3).
24. See Waldman, supra note 21. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 2,
at 803-04, 810-11 (discussing classifications as primary publishers or secondary
publishers (distributors) and the corresponding levels of liability for each
classification). See also Robert M. O'Neil, The Drudge Case: A Look at Issues in
Cyberspace Defamation, 73 WASH. L. REV. 623, 627-29 (1998) (analyzing the
publisher/distributor classification in cyberspace).
25. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
26. See id. at 329.
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providing the plaintiff's name and home telephone number on the
t-shirts. Mr. Zeran sued AOL (1) for failing to remove the posting
after he gave the company notification and (2) because AOL did
not post a retraction.' The court adopted a broad reading of the
ISP immunity granted by the CDA holding that immunity extended
to ISPs regardless of their classifications as either publishers or
distributors."
Critics of the Zeran decision argue that the court's
interpretation negated the primary purpose of section 230, which
was to encourage ISPs to continue to content-monitor their sites.3"
Before Congress passed the CDA, the Stratton decision provided a
disincentive for ISPs to content-monitor. With the enactment of
the CDA, section 230, also known as the "Good Samaritan
Provision," guaranteed immunity for those ISPs who voluntarily,
and in "good faith," blocked or screened offensive material.3' But
by eliminating any possible liability for ISPs, even as distributors
with knowledge of the defamatory posting, the court has again
created a disincentive for ISPs to content-monitor.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 329-30.
29. If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they
would face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially
defamatory statement-from any party, concerning any message. Each
notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the circumstances
surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment concerning the information's
defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether to risk
liability by allowing the continued publication of that information. Although this
might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings
on interactive computer services would create an impossible burden in the Internet
context. Because service providers would be subject to liability only for the
publication of information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural
incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were
defamatory or not. Thus liability upon notice has a chilling effect on the freedom
of Internet speech.
Similarly, notice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating
the dissemination of offensive material over their own services. Any efforts by a
service provider to investigate and screen material posted on its service would only
lead to notice of potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby
create a stronger basis for liability. Instead of subjecting themselves to further
possible lawsuits, service providers would likely eschew any attempts at self-
regulation. (citations omitted.) See id. at 333.
30. See Waldman, supra note 21.
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (1996).
32. See Michelle J. Kane, Electronic Commerce: Internet Service Provider
Liability: Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483 (1999); Waldman,
supra note 21; Robert T. Langdon, Note, The Communications Decency Act § 230:
Make Sense? Or Nonsense?-A Private Person's Inability to Recover if Defamed in
Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 829, 848 (1999).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Soon after Zeran, Blumenthal v. Drudge was decided.33 In
Blumenthal, Sidney Blumenthal, a then newly appointed White
House aide, sued a gossip columnist and AOL for defamation.
4
The columnist, Mathew Drudge, who was under contract with AOL
for his services, posted an article alleging that Mr. Blumenthal was
a wife-beater." Though AOL and Drudge later retracted the
36story, Blumenthal sued both AOL and Drudge.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted summary judgment to AOL citing the immunity provided
to ISPs through section 230 of the CDA 7  Although the court
indicated it would have entertained arguments that AOL was a
distributor under the common law of defamation, the Zeran court's
interpretation of section 230 precluded such a hearing.38 While
holding to the precedent that Zeran established, the court
expressed its frustration with an interpretation of section 230 that
allowed AOL to contract for and post Drudge's report, while not
facing liability for its falsity.39
D. Additional Defamation Issues
1. Employer Liability for Electronic Defamation by
Employees-It is important to recognize that section 230 only
immunizes ISPs.40 Therefore, the possibility exists that an employer
may be liable for an online defamatory statement made by an
employee.4 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that party
33. 992 F. Supp. 44, 46-47 (D.D.C. 1998).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 46.
36. See id. at 48.
37. See id. at 49 ("Whether wisely or not, [Congress] made the legislative
judgment to effectively immunize providers of interactive computer services from
civil liability in tort with respect to material disseminated by them but created by
others.").
38. See id. at 51 (concluding that the court in Zeran provided a comprehensive
interpretation of Section 230's application to ISPs).
39. See id. (questioning legislative action that allows an ISP to reap the
benefits of a columnist, while escaping all liability for his postings). See also Kane,
supra note 32, at 491.
40. But see Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-Mail and Employer Liability:
Why Razing Zeran v. American Online is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 32
(2000), http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i5/article4.html (last visited May 10, 2001)
(proposing that section 230 of the CDA, which immunizes ISPs, defines
"interactive computer service" so broadly as to include most employers who
provide Internet access to employees) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (1996)).
41. Though the CDA offers some immunity to employers, see 47 U.S.C. §
223(e)(4) (1996), the immunity does not appear to cover defamatory statements
made by employees. For an analysis comparing the CDA's immunities for
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A is liable for a defamatory statement posted by party B on land or
chattels in A's possession or under A's control if party A was made
aware of the defamatory statement and failed to remove the
42
defamatory statement. As the use of company electronic bulletin
boards and chat rooms increases, employers in control of these e-
forums may need to act quickly to remove any defamatory
statement brought to their attentions.43 In a recently decided case,
the New Jersey Supreme Court left open the possibility that
Continental Airlines may be liable for defamatory messages posted
by its pilots on a frequently used company bulletin board accessible
through the Internet." The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded
the case to a trial court for a decision on whether the electronic
forum was an "integral part of the workplace.,
45
2. The Publication Element of Defamation and E-mail-E-
mail is another area where employers must be wary because they
may be vicariously liable for defamatory e-mail messages sent by
their employees. ' As mentioned earlier, publication is a necessary
element of defamation.47  Because most e-mail messages are
instantly copied to another computer or server when sent, these
additional copies may constitute a publication. Thus, if employee
A writes an e-mail message defaming employee B and sends it only
to B, A may be held to have defamed B, who may then seek to hold
her employer vicariously liable.'
3. Targeting the "John Doe" Online Critics-With ISPs
largely immune from defamation suits, recent legal disputes have
employers and ISPs, see Kaitlin Garvey, Note, The New Corporate Dilemma:
Avoiding Liability in the Age of Internet Technology, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133
(1999).
42. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 577(2).
43. See Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 759 (1952) (allowing a woman to sue a
bar owner for failing to remove a defamatory statement about her from the men's
room after the bartender was notified).
44. See Blakely v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).
45. See id. at 551. The Supreme Court's decision did not discuss the CDA.
Specifically, the court did not mention any immunity for Continental as an
employer under section 223. Further, the court expressed reluctance to hold
CompuServe, Continental's ISP, liable, see id. at 552, n.l, but did so without
finding CompuServe had immunity under section 230 of the CDA.
46. See Mia G. Settle-Vinson, Employer Liability for Messages Sent by
Employees via Email and Voice Mail Systems, 24 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 55, 71
(1998).
47. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
48. Compare O'Neil, supra note 24, at 629-30 (proposing a "presumed
publication" rule for online messages), with KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 803
(describing the traditional rule where the defendant is not liable for written
statements made about the plaintiff that are sent to the plaintiff in a sealed
envelope which is subsequently opened by a third party).
2001]
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arisen as victims of defamation have sought a more direct approach
to stemming the tide of anonymous online bashing of companies."
Companies damaged by lies and fictitious stories, often made under
the cloak of anonymity provided by Internet chat rooms," have
begun to subpoena ISPs for the identities of the anonymous
writers.51 Having the identities of the critics allows the companies
to bring defamation suits against the individuals who enjoy no
immunity under the CDA . In one case, a company specializing in
providing financial education lectures filed a defamation suit,
fostering the possibility to subpoena Yahoo!, an ISP, for the
identities of ten "John Does" who posted derogatory comments
about the company's CEO on one of Yahoo!'s message boards.53
More than seventy such lawsuits have been filed around the
country in the last few years." To date, ISPs have been complying,55
which has spawned additional litigation by angry ISP users
attempting to keep their identities secret. 6 Online customers who
49. See Company Files Defamation Action against "John Doe" Internet User,
16 No. 4 COMPUTER LAW 27 (1999).
50. Such lies or half-truths are known as "cybersmears." See David L. Sobel,
The Process that "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet
Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, at 112 (2000). Companies fear that wide
dissemination of sensitive or false information over the Internet may even hurt
stock prices. See id.
51. See Carl S. Kaplan, Judge Says Online Critic has No Right to Hide, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/06/cyber/cyberlaw
/09law.html (last visited May 10, 2001) (hereinafter No Right to Hide); Carl S.
Kaplan, In Fight over Anonymity, John Doe Starts Slugging, N.Y. TIMES (June 2,
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/06/cyber/cyberlaw/O2law.html (last
visited May 10, 2001); Carl S. Kaplan, Companies Fight Anonymous Critics with
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (March 12, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99
/03/cyber/cyberlaw/12law.html (last visited May 10, 2001) (hereinafter Companies
Fight). In the home county of AOL, the sheriff, during a four-month period in
1999, served seventy warrants seeking information from AOL. See Sobel, supra
note 50, T 2, n.1 (citing Stephen Dinan, Search Warrants Keep AOL Busy, WASH.
TIMES, April 27, 1999, at C4).
52. See Companies Fight, supra note 51.
53. See id.
54. See No Right to Hide, supra note 51.
55. AOL's policy is to notify the anonymous users of any civil subpoenas and
give them fourteen days to try to block the subpoena. See Associated Press,
Raytheon Drops Suit Over Internet Chat, (May 22, 1999), http://www.nytimes.
com/library/tech/99/05/biztech/articles/22raytheon.html (last visited May 10, 2001).
After that time, if the subpoena is not blocked, AOL turns over the identities to
the party seeking them. See id. However, Yahoo! has been widely criticized for
complying with subpoenas without notifying the users involved. See Sobel, supra
note 50, 14.
56. Rebecca Fairley Raney, Judge Rejects Online Critics Effort to Remain
Anonymous, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech
/99/06/cyber/articles/15identity.html (last visited May 10, 2001) (hereinafter Judge
[Vol. 106:2
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have been resisting subpoenas that work to unmask their identities
claim that their free speech rights are being compromised. 7
Moreover, others argue that basic notions of fairness and due
process are at stake." Nonetheless, in at least some jurisdictions,
courts are siding with ISPs that turn over the identities of the
alleged defamers to the companies seeking them."
II. Copyright
A. Introduction
Copyright law in the United States is literally as old as the
Constitution.6° In fact, the Constitution provides for the protection
of authors' rights "To promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors ...the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries ....
Today, copyright law is codified by federal statute,62 which
protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression" including literary, musical, and dramatic works;
pantomimes; choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; motion picture and other audiovisual works; and sound
recordings.63 A fundamental principle of copyright law is that it
protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.'
Rejects) (A California judge allows a modem company to subpoena Yahoo! for the
identity of an online critic concluding that "there is no right to free speech to
defame.").
57. See No Right to Hide, supra note 51 (rejecting First Amendment
arguments and ordering Yahoo! and AOL to turn over identities to plaintiff who
claims he lost his job based on the defendant "John Doe's" online comments); see
Judge Rejects, supra note 56 (also rejecting defendant's First Amendment
arguments).
58. See Sobel, supra note 50, 14. Sobel argues further that judicial
intervention and subscriber notice of a subpoena is necessary to protect John
Doe's rights. See id. 18.
59. See No Right to Hide, supra note 51 and accompanying text; see Judge
Rejects, supra note 56 and accompanying text. However, Sobel suggests that
obtaining the identities of online critics is merely the quickest way to silence them,
even without pursuing any further litigation against them. See Sobel, supra note
50, 1 15.
60. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
61. See id.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 101-1332 (1994 and Supp. 1995-2000) (originally enacted as the
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541).
63. See id. § 102(a).
64. See id. § 102(b) (stating specifically that ideas, processes, procedures and
the like cannot, under any circumstances, be copyrighted).
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A copyright becomes valid from the moment a work is created
and fixed in a medium.65 A copyright generally remains valid for
the life of the author plus seventy years.66 During this time, no one
may reproduce or distribute the work, perform or display the work
in public, or prepare derivative works from the copyrighted work
without the author's permission.67
Because the list of copyrightable works is not fixed, it changes
with time and technology.68 As changes are necessary, the Consti-
tution gives Congress the power to make legislative modifications
to protect authors.69 For example, the Copyright Act has been
amended to extend copyright protection to computer programs. 7°
B. Copyright and the Internet
The Internet's speed, wide accessibility, rapid growth, and
ability to make exact duplicates of digital files have created
copyright issues primarily relating to infringements of an author's
exclusive right to reproduce his copyrighted works. For example,
the Internet allows an individual to distribute a single computer
program or other copyrighted work illegally to millions of users,
virtually without cost, by merely making it available on a single
server and pointing others to that location. Congress has
responded to some of the copyright issues raised by the Internet. In
1997 Congress enacted the No Electronic Theft Act (NET Act) in
an effort to close a loophole in the Copyright Act which permitted
infringers to pirate copyrighted works willfully and knowingly, so
long as they did not do so for profit.7' The NET Act amended
65. See id. § 102(a). Though not required to create a copyright, it is advisable
to include a copyright notice, and to register the work, both of which may be
necessary to recover certain damages under the Act. See Jeffrey G. Raphelson,
Old Laws, New Laws, and New Technology: A Summary of Some Laws Affecting
Use of the Internet, 77 MICH. B.J. 1202, 1203 (1998).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. 1995-2000).
67. See id. § 106.
68. See id. § 102(a) (The Act includes language protecting original expressions
"now known or later developed.").
69. Sheldon W. Halpren, Nies Memorial Lecture: Copyright Law in the Digital
Age: Malum in Se and Malum in Prohibitum (Mar. 16, 2000), in 4 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1 (2000) ("What you find if you simply trace the legislation from the
late Eighteenth Century to the present is a continuing expansion of the scope of
copyright, the scope of copyright owners' rights, and the term of copyright,
reflecting some kind of consensus that this kind of protection is needed.").
70. Computer Software Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028
(1980) (codified as amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1994 and Supp. 1995-2000)).
71. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678
(1997).
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federal copyright law to define "financial gain" to include the
receipt of anything of value, including the receipt of other
copyrighted works. The NET Act also clarified that when Internet
users or any other individuals distribute copyrighted works broadly,
even if they did not intend to personally profit, they have violated
the Copyright Act. The Act accomplished this by imposing
penalties for willfully infringing a copyright: (1) for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain, or (2) by repro-
ducing or distributing, including by electronic means, one or more
copies of one or more copyrighted works with a total retail value of
more than $1,000 during any 180-day period. 3 It also extended the
statute of limitations for criminal copyright infringement from three
to five years. 4 Moreover, it increased criminal penalties for certain
copyright violations:75 imprisonment may be imposed for up to five
years (ten years for subsequent offenses) for willful infringement if
the infringer reproduces or distributes at least ten copies or
phonorecords with a total retail value of more than $2,500 in a 180-
day period. 6
In 1998 Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA")," which amended the Copyright Act to implement
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright
Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of
1996.78 The WIPO treaty called for adequate legal protection and
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by copyright owners to
prevent unauthorized exercise of their copyrights. 9
The DMCA contains three principal anticircumvention
provisions. The first provision prohibits the act of circumventing a
technological protection measure put in place by a copyright owner
to control access to a copyrighted work.' Under the DMCA, "to
circumvent a technological measure" means "to descramble a
72. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1995-2000).
73. Id. § 506(a).
74. Id. §507(a).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1994 and Supp. 1995-2000).
76. Id.
77. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860,
2887 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
78. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Article 11, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip
/copyright.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2001); WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/performances/index.html (last visited
Dec. 28, 2001).
79. WIPO Copyright Treaty, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/copyright.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2001).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (Supp. 1995-2000).
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scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to
avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner."81  The
second provision prohibits creating or making available tech-
nologies developed or advertised to defeat technological
protections against unauthorized access to a copyrighted work.82
The third provision prohibits creating or making available tech-
nologies developed or advertised to defeat technological
protections against unauthorized copying or other infringements of
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.' Thus, the first two
prohibitions deal with access controls while the third prohibition
deals with copy controls. They make it illegal, for example, to
create or distribute a computer program that can break the access
or copy protection security code on an electronic book or a DVD
movie. The Act provides civil remedies including injunctions,
damages (actual and statutory), attorneys' fees, and destruction of
the offending device.' It also imposes criminal penalties of fines or
imprisonment or both.85
The Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages
Improvement Act of 1999 amended federal copyright law with
respect to the statutory damages available for copyright infringe-
ment by increasing the minimum damages from $500 to $750 and
the maximum damages from $20,000 to $30,000. 6 It also increased
the maximum additional damages a court may award for willful
infringement from $100,000 to $150,000.87
Because an author has the exclusive right to reproduce and
display his work, posting a copyrighted work or sending an e-mail
containing that work may constitute copyright infringement.' It is
virtually impossible to view or post anything on the Internet
without making a copy of it, at least temporarily in the computer's
RAM,89 on the computer's hard drive, or on a floppy disk.' Courts
81. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
82. Id. § 1201(a)(2).
83. Id.§ 1201(b)(1).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. 1995-2000).
85. Id. § 1204(a).
86. The Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act
of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999) (codified as amending 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c) (Supp. 1995-2000) to increase statutory damages for copyright
infringement).
87. Id.
88. See Raphelson, supra note 65, at 1203.
89. RAM is the acronym for random access memory, which is a common form
of computer memory that temporarily stores information for software or web sites
as they are used. See Webopedia at http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/R/
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have held that even a temporary copy of another person's work
made in RAM constitutes copyright infringement.91 Furthermore,
e-mails also fall within the scope of some of these decisions, since
any electronic transmission containing the copyrighted work may
violate the author's exclusive right to distribute,92 to perform, or to
display the work in public.'
The music industry has been the most publicized entity to raise
concerns about the electronic distribution of copyrighted works.
The emergence of the MP394 file format has provided millions of
users the opportunity to download compact disc quality music from
the Internet. Because these exchanges are usually established
RAM.html (last visited May 10, 2001).
90. See Fred H. Cate, Note, Law in Cyberspace, 39 How. L.J. 565, 575 (1996)
("It is simply impossible to read, view, listen to, print, upload, download, transfer,
or otherwise access digital expression without making at least one copy of it.").
The author makes an interesting comparison between online and hardcopy
versions of newspapers. Though the Copyright Act does not protect ideas or facts,
the facts and ideas contained in online newspapers are essentially protected
because the paper cannot be viewed without making a reproduction. See id. at 577.
However, the hard copy version of the same newspaper could be shared with a
friend without making a reproduction; therefore, allowing the facts and ideas to be
viewed without violating the Copyright Act. See id.
91. See Ian C. Ballon, Using Trademarks to Drive Traffic to Web Sites and
Other E-commerce Law Issues, 599 PL/PAT 111, 127-128 (2000) (citing Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1378
(N.D. Cal. 1995) for the proposition that browsing on the Internet creates a copy in
RAM that courts have found to be a violation of the Copyright Act); William M.
Hart, An Overview of the Copyright Law, 599 PLI/PAT 7, 107-09 (2000) (citing
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) where the
court rejected argument that copy in RAM does not infringe because it is not
"fixed"). See also Raymond Chan, Internet Framing: Complement or Hijack?, 5
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 143, 165 (1998-1999) (analyzing whether the
individual "packets" of information that may be stored in the RAMs of many
different computers during an Internet transmission constitute infringements);
Allison Roarty, Note, Link Liability: The Argument for Inline Links and Frames as
Infringements of the Copyright Display Right, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1011, 1037
n.222 (1999) (noting that the Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998 provides a
narrow exception to RAM infringement where computer repairs are being made).
92. See Keith Kupferschmid, Lost in Cyberspace: The Digital Demise of the
First-sale Doctrine, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 825, 850 (1998)
(interpreting the Copyright Act as recognizing that a distribution occurs whenever
"a work is transferred from one location to another," or from one computer to
another via the Internet).
93. See Cate, supra note 90, at 576 (concluding that reading a copyrighted
work on one's computer constitutes an infringing public display or performance
within the Act's definition).
94. MP3 is short for "Motion Picture Experts Group Layer 3 Compression
Format," which is the latest file format ideal for digitally storing and copying
music. See Mary Jane Frisby, Note, Rockin' Down the Highway: Forging a Path
for the Lawful Use of MP3 Digital Music Files, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 317, 318-19 (1999).
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between two computers through the World Wide Web, ISPs
became a prime target for liability.9 Depending on an ISP's intent,
knowledge, or control related to the infringing behavior of it users,
courts have held ISPs liable for direct, contributory or vicarious
infringement.96  However, Congress essentially immunized ISPs
against liability for third-party infringement in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.9' A clear consequence of this
Congressional action parallels what occurred after the passage of
the CDA's ISP immunizing provisions: the actual "John Doe
Infringer" will be targeted.98
Although ISPs have effectively been insulated from liability
relating to MP3 downloads, the courts have not yet conclusively
resolved whether the end user who downloads copyrighted material
is liable for copyright infringement.' Further, the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA")," ° may be too specific to address
potential infringement when downloaded files are copied onto a
portable device used to play them. '0 In a recent case, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that hard drives are not covered in
the AHRA; therefore, portable devices that store the MP3 files on
a hard drive are legal. °2 In the aftermath of that decision, most
95. See Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning in: The Future of Copyright
Protection for Online Music in the Digital Millennium, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2445,
2457 (2000).
96. See id. at 2457-58 (discussing inconsistent court decisions on ISP copyright
infringement liability). See also Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. 1361, at 1361
(denying summary judgment because there was a material issue of fact whether
ISP was contributorily liable for providing Internet access to the electronic bulletin
board where the plaintiff's copyrighted information was located).
97. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV
1998)). See Pollack, supra note 95, at 2466.
98. See Pollack, supra note 95, at 2467.
99. See, e.g., Halpren, supra note 69, at *8 ("The exemption, the immunity,
that was built into the Audio Home Recording Act directed to audio visual tape is
broad enough so that when you download an MP3 music file from a web site onto
your hard disk, you are not committing an act of infringement."); Pollack, supra
note 95, at 2461-62.
100. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1001-10
(2001)). The recording industry lobbied for the AHRA to limit significantly the
copying of CDs by digital audiotape recorders. See Pollack, supra note 95, at 2461.
101. The recording industry lobbied for the AHRA to limit significantly the
copying of CDs by digital audiotape recorders. See Pollack, supra note 95, at 2461.
102. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072, 1076-81 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that computer hard drives, which
are usually involved in downloading MP3 files, are exempt from the act). The
Recording Industry Association of America sued on the basis of alleged violations
of the AHRA; it did not sue for alleged copyright infringement. See Rebecca J.
Hill, Comment, Pirates of the 21st Century: The Threat and Promise of Digital
Audio Technology on the Internet, 16 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 311, 332-33
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commentators now agree that Congress's carefully worded AHRA
was too specific to cover the downloading of MP3 files from the
Internet
°0 3
Web sites dedicated to MP3 distribution have come under fire
in federal courts. A number of recording companies and music
publishers sued Napster, a web-based company that offered a
program that created a user-driven database and search engine to
facilitate MP3 downloads.'" The plaintiffs claimed that Napster
was liable for copyright infringement based on contributory
infringement and vicarious liability.'5 In support of the plaintiffs'
claims, the plaintiffs argued that Napster committed copyright
infringement by engaging in or assisting others in copying,
distributing, downloading, transmitting, or uploading copyrighted
music without the express permission of the copyright owners.106
On appeal, the court (1) held that Napster was liable for
contributory infringement and vicarious liability only to the extent
that it was aware that copyrighted works were available on its
servers and that it failed to prevent their free exchange and (2)
upheld the plaintiffs' right to an injunction against Napster but
modified it to conform to these limitations."'7
The music industry sued the MP3.com company for copyright
infringement because MP3.com provided a means for users to
download songs in an MP3 format if those users owned the CDs
from which the songs came. The court found that the defendant
had willfully infringed plaintiffs' copyrights and ordered judgment
in the amount of $53,400,000.108
1. Linking and Framing-Hyperlinking enables Internet
users to move quickly and easily from one web site to another.0 9
When a web site is linked to another, a user can click on highlighted
text or a graphic which triggers the page displayed to switch to the
new "linked" page."0 Though most web site owners encourage
links to their sites because it increases the number of hits, or visitors
(2000).
103. See, e.g., Halpren, supra note 69, at *9; Pollack, supra note 95, at 2461-62.
104. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5446 (9th Cir.
2001).
105. Id. at 1011.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1021, 1027.
108. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
109. See Roarty, supra note 91, at 1014-15.
110. See id. (providing a detailed analysis of the different methods used to link).
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to their sites, others may not want additional links.' Hyperlinking
to a file without an owner's permission may be a violation of his
exclusive right to display, distribute, or reproduce that file in
public."
2
Framing on the Internet occurs when the information from the
linked web site is viewed from within the linking web site."3 For
example, a user on X's web site clicks on a link to Y's web site.
Instead of being sent directly to Y's web site, the information is
imported into X's web site. This can be misleading as to which web
site is providing the linked information because the user views the
linked site's information bordered, or framed, by the linking site.
Thus, it appears that the linking site is providing the information.
In one landmark case, the Washington Post sued Total News for
copyright and trademark infringement after Total News continued
to frame the Washington Post's articles.' 4 When a user on the Total
News site clicked on the Washington Post link, the article appeared,
but it remained framed by the Total News web site.' Thus, it gave
the appearance that Total News was the source of the
information."6
A significant case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,"7
was a 2000 United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York case that involved linking. Motion picture studios
distribute many of their copyrighted motion pictures for home use
on digital versatile disks ("DVDs"), which contain copies of the
motion pictures in digital form."8 They protect those motion
111. See id. at 1016.
112. See Jeffrey J. Look, The Virtual Wild, Wild West (WWW): Intellectual
Property Issues in Cyberspace- Trademarks, Service Marks, Copyrights, and
Domain Names, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 49 (1999). However, some
argue that the Internet boasts an implied license to link. See Robert L. Tucker,
Information Superhighway Robbery: The Tortious Misuse of Links, Frames,
Metatags, and Domain Names, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 37 (1999).
113. See Roarty, supra note 91, at 1018 (describing in detail the technical
aspects of web site framing).
114. No. 97-Civ.-1190 (S.D.N.Y June 5, 1997). See also Look, supra note 112, at
80.
115. See Look, supra note 112, at 80.
116. The parties ultimately settled agreeing that Total News could continue
linking to the plaintiffs' web sites but could not use framing technology and that
Total News had to show that the information was being provided by the
Washington Post. See Look, supra note 112, at 80. See also Futuredontics, Inc. v.
Applied Anagramics, Inc., 1998 WL 132922 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1998), affd 152
F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998) (permitting a copyright infringement claim based on
framing).
117. 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
11& Id. at 303.
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pictures by using an encryption system called Content Scramble
System ("CSS") that prevents copying."9 CSS-protected motion
pictures on DVDs may be viewed only on players and computer
drives equipped with licensed technology that permits the devices
to decrypt and play, but not copy, the films. In late 1999, computer
hackers devised a computer program called "DeCSS" that circum-
vented the CSS protection system and allowed CSS-protected
motion pictures to be copied and played on devices that lack the
licensed decryption technology.' Eric Corley and his company,
2600 Enterprises, Inc, quickly posted DeCSS on their Internet web
site, thus making it readily available. 2 ' Eight major United States-
based movie studios brought suit under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"). The movie studios sought to enjoin
Eric Corley and his company from publicly posting DeCSS and to
prevent them from electronically "linking" their site to others that
publicly posted DeCSS. Eric Corley and his company responded
with what they termed "electronic civil disobedience": increasing
their efforts to link their web site to a large number of other web
sites that continued to make DeCSS available.'22
The court issued an injunction in favor of the motion picture
studios, stating:
In this case, plaintiffs have established by clear and convincing
evidence that these defendants linked to sites posting DeCSS,
knowing that it was a circumvention device. Indeed, they
initially touted it as a way to get free movies, and they later
maintained the links to promote the dissemination of the
program in an effort to defeat effective judicial relief. They now
know that dissemination of DeCSS violates the DMCA. An
anti-linking injunction on these facts does no violence to the
First Amendment. Nor should it chill the activities of web site
operators dealing with different materials, as they may be held
liable only on a compelling showing of deliberate evasion of the
statute. 123
2. Fair Use-There are, however, valid defenses to
accusations of copyright infringement. The copyright laws are
based on balancing an author's rights to protect his work with the





123. Id. at 341 (citations omitted).
124. See Cate, supra note 90, at 574.
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provides that the fair use of a copyrighted work for purposes such
as comment, criticism, news reporting, research, scholarship, or
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) is not an
infringement of copyright. 125 In determining whether the use of a
work in any particular case is fair, the courts consider the following
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.26  In past cases
addressing new technologies, the United States Supreme Court has
suggested that Congress, not the courts, determine what constitutes
fair use. 127
Some commentators have suggested that copyright law has
shifted its focus from penalizing reproducers, who copy for personal
use, to punishing the exploiters who seek to benefit commercially.
Other groups support the "Copyleft" movement, which seeks to
keep new technologies open for all. 29  The Copyleft movement
encourages special licenses that allow software to be leased to
anyone who agrees not to copyright the software.3' Users can then




Like copyright law, federal law primarily governs trademark
law. The Federal Trademark Act (the Lanham Act)'32 recognizes
four types of trade symbols or marks. A trademark is a distinctive
mark, word, letter, number, design, picture, or combination in any
arrangement that a person adopts or uses to identify the goods he
125. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001); Pollack, supra note 95, at 2459.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
127. See Pollack, supra note 95, at 2460 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)).
128. See Halpren, supra note 69, at *10.
129. See Teresa Hill, Fragmenting the Copyleft Movement: The Public Will Not
Prevail, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 797 (1999).
130. See id. at 811.
131. See id.
132. Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(2001)).
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manufactures or sells from those manufactured or sold by others.133
A service mark is used to identify and distinguish the services of
one person from those of others.' A certification mark is used in
connection with goods or services to certify accuracy, composition,
mode of manufacture, origin, quality, or that the work or labor in
the goods or services was performed by members of a union or
other organization.'35 A collective mark is a distinctive mark or
symbol used to indicate either that the producer or provider
belongs to a fraternal society, organization, trade association, trade
union, or that members of a collective group produced the goods or
services."'
To be protected by the Lanham Act, a mark must be
distinctive enough to clearly identify the origin of goods or
services.37 Notwithstanding, the trademark may not be immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous.' Trademark infringement occurs when a
person without authorization uses an identical or substantially
indistinguishable mark that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
deceipt. 3'
B. The Internet and Trademarks
Trademark issues on the Internet first arose with domain
names. A domain name is the technical name for a web site's
electronic address on the Internet." The domain name constitutes
one of the most important ways a user locates a web site. For
example, www.unc.edu, www.sony.com, and www.pepsi.com are
domain names. Until recently, registering a domain name was done
on a first come, first served basis. 4' This prior custom has brought
about a practice called Cybersquatting. Cybersquatting is the




137. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2001).
138. Id. (providing a complete list of registration restrictions). See also Look,
supra note 112, at 51-56 (describing in greater detail the pitfalls of trade symbol
registration, which includes trademarks, service marks, and others covered by the
Lanham Act).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2001). However, the same words or symbols may be
registered for trademarks in different areas of commerce if public confusion is
unlikely (e.g., Apple or Delta). See Look, supra note 112, at 52.
140. See Tucker, supra note 112, 9 12-14. Common "top-level" domain names
are .COM, .GOV. and .EDU. See Look, supra note 112, at 51.
141. Until 1999, all domain names were registered by Network Solutions, Inc.
See Look, supra note 112, at 55 n.30. Now more than twenty companies can
register domain names. See id.
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registering of domain names containing trademarks owned by
others with the intent to sell the rights to the domain name to the
companies who own the trademarks. 4 2 The legal issue raised by
cybersquatting is that registering domain names of established
companies may constitute trademark infringement. In a well-
known case, Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen,' Dennis Toeppen
registered more than 200 domain names including: crateand
barrel.com, ussteel.com, and deltaair-lines.com." Intermatic, Inc.
had been in existence since 1941 and had registered "Intermatic" as
a trademark. Intermatic sued Toeppen for trademark infringement
for using the domain name "intermatic.com. ' ,14 Although the court
denied Intermatic's summary judgment motion on infringement, it
did grant Intermatic's motion for summary judgment on trademark
dilution.
1 46
In 1999, Congress amended the Lanham Act by passing the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act147 in response to the
increasing number of lawsuits against cybersquatters"' The Act
allows the owner of a mark to bring a civil suit against any person
who, with a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, registers or
uses a domain name that, at the time of its registration, (1) is
identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark; (2) dilutes a
famous mark; or (3) is a protected trademark, word, or name."'
The Act specifies factors a court may consider in determining bad
faith intent, but prohibits such a determination if the defendant
believed, with reasonable grounds, that the use of the domain name
142. See id. at 60.
143. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
144. See Raphelson, supra note 65, at 1205.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
148. See Tucker, supra note 112, at T 92 (1999) (citing Greg Miller, Cyber
Squatters Give Carl's Jr. Others Net Loss, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at Al).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2001). See Joel Voelzke, New Cybersquatting Law Gives
Trademark Owners Powerful New Weapons Against Domain Name Pirates, 17 No.
2 COMPUTER LAW 3 (2000).
The Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, which became section 43(c) of the
Lanham Act, also made it easier to crack down on cybersquatters. Pub. L. No.
104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996). See Raphelson, supra note 65, at 1205. The
Trademark Dilution Act allowed owners of "famous" trademarks to seek
injunctions against those whose marks diluted the distinctiveness of their marks.
See id. Diluting a mark's distinctiveness is possible even where the parties do not
compete in the same area of commerce. See id. In comparison, proving
infringement requires showing that consumers would likely be confused by the
new mark, which is not probable when the marks represent businesses in totally
different areas of commerce. See id.
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was fair or otherwise lawful.5 It authorizes a court to order
cancellation of the domain name or its transfer to the owner of the
mark. In addition to injunctive relief, it makes available remedies
such as recovery of the defendant's profits, actual damages,
attorneys' fees and court costs. It also provides for statutory
damages in an amount of at least $1,000 and up to $100,000 per
domain name, as the court considers just. The Act shields a
registrar, registry, or other registration authority from liability for
damages for the registration or maintenance of a domain name for
another, unless there is a showing of bad faith intent to profit from
such registration or maintenance of the domain name registration."'
In response to the restrictions of the 1999 Act, cybersquatters
have begun to register domain names that are incapable of being
registered as trademarks.'52 For example, generic words cannot be
registered as trademarks, so cybersquatters have been registering
domain names such as www.lawyer.com and www.business.com'5
Moreover, cybersquatting has spawned a new cottage industry,
cyber bounty hunters,'54 who specialize in surfing the net for
trademark infringers and cybersquatters"'
An alternative way for users to find Internet sites is by using
search engines, each of which uses its own algorithm for searching
through the Internet and arranging the order of the sites it reports.
The operating mechanism of search engines has generated legal
issues regarding the use of metatags. Metatags are essentially key
words that web site designers and owners use to describe the
contents of their sites. These words and phrases are embedded
within the HTML document and are not readily visible.' Search
engines such as Yahoo! and Excite use these metatags to create
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2001). See Joel Voelzke, New Cybersquatting Law Gives
Trademark Owners Powerful New Weapons Against Domain Name Pirates, 17 No.
2 COMPUTER LAW 3 (2000).
151. See id. The Act also allows plaintiffs to file in rem actions against the
domain name itself. This provision is especially beneficial when the domain name
owner cannot be located, or for whom personal jurisdiction cannot be achieved.
152. See Look, supra note 112 at 69.
153. See id. In addition, the development of new top-level domain names, i.e.
.biz, may cause more consumer confusion as identical names registered under
.com, could also be registered under .biz. See id. at 83. Recently, the addition of
new top-level domain names .biz and .info were approved by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). http://www.icann.org
/announcements/icann-prl5may0l.htm (last visited May 30, 2001).
154. See Look, supra note 112, at 60.
155. See id.
156. See Tucker, supra note 112, 70.
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large indexes that are scanned for matches when users ask a search
engine to find web sites on specific subjects."7
Legal controversy has arisen when one web site uses metatags
that are actually trademarks of another company in order to divert
traffic form the competitor's site to its own site. The practical result
is that a user who searches for Brand X may be sent to Brand Y's
web site because Brand Y uses Brand X's trademark as a "hidden"
metatag. The first such metatag case was Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
v. Calvin Designer Label where the defendant used "playboy" as a
metatag for its site."' The court, ruling for Playboy, enjoined
Calvin Designer Label from further use of that trademark. 9 Thus,
courts have upheld suits alleging trademark infringement or
dilution where the purpose of the metatag was to confuse or
deceive consumers.16°
Another type of metatag litigation has involved the banner
advertisements often displayed on the web sites of search engines in
an attempt to attract a user to the advertiser's site. 161 In a common
but controversial Internet advertising practice known as keying, a
search engine offers advertisers the ability to display specific
banner ads whenever users enter selected search terms, including
trademarks or metatags of a competitor's site.162 For example,
Estee Lauder sued Excite for federal trademark infringement after
users who typed in trademarked product names of Estee Lauder
were presented with banner ads for "The Fragrance Counter.'
63
With few court decisions in this area, experts disagree on the likely
success of trademark infringement or dilution claims brought by
companies against search engines that sell their "keywords" to
competitors.6
157. See id.
158. See id. 74 (citing 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997)).
159. See 985 F. Supp. at 1221-22.
160. See Tucker, supra note 112, 78. An exception to the use of trademarked
metatags may be where a web site sells the trademarked products for that
company. See id.
161. See Matthew A. Kaminer, The Limitations of Trademark Law in
Addressing Trademark Keyword Banners, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 35, 41 (1999).
162. See id. at 42.
163. See id. at 44 n.52.
164. Compare, Kaminer, supra note 161, at 45-53 (arguing that the Lanham Act
does not prohibit the use of trademarks as triggers for banner ads), with Tucker,
supra note 112, at T 87 (predicting that such unauthorized trademark uses violate
at least federal and state dilution laws).
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IV. Patents
A. Introduction
Patents, unlike copyrights or trademarks, protect ideas and
processes." Through a patent, the federal government grants an
inventor a monopolistic right to make, use, or sell an invention to
the absolute exclusion of others for the life of the patent. 166 To be
patentable as a utility patent, the process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter must meet three criteria: (1) novelty,167 (2)
utility, 68 and (3) non-obviousness. 169 Utility patents have a life that
begins on the date of the patent's grant and ends twenty years from
the date of the filing of the application.170 The patent owner may
also profit by licensing use the patent to others. The patent may
not be renewed and, upon expiration, the invention enters the
"public domain." Once in the public domain, anyone may use the
patent.
B. The Internet and Patents
The explosion of business use of the Internet has necessitated
new ways of doing business to adapt to the demands of e-
commerce. In the landmark case concerning the validity of
patenting such business methods, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc,7 ' the court held as patentable a
computerized financial system in which individual mutual funds'
165. See Raphelson, supra note 65, at 1204. However, very much like
copyrights, protection for inventors is stated in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
art I, § 8, cl. 8. Also like copyrights and trademarks, patent law is statutory. See 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
166. Once a patent has been issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, an
inventor has the exclusive rights to make, use and sell his invention. See
Raphelson, supra note 65, at 1204.
167. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
168. See id. § 101.
169. See id. § 103.
170. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1998). Design patents protect "the ornamental aspects of
a design or an article of manufacture" for fourteen years from date of issue. Id. §
173. Finally, plant patents are issued as either utility or design patents for plants
that have been genetically altered in some way. See id. Indeed, a key Internet
issue of web designs and icons is determining whether one should seek design
patent, copyright, or trademark protection. See Look, supra note 112, at 85-88.
171. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). See
William D. Wiese, Death of a Myth: The Patenting of Internet Business Models
After State Street Bank, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 36-37 (2000).
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contributions to an investment portfolio are calculated daily.'72 This
decision paved the way for other Internet business patents such as:
(1) Lycos's Internet search method; (2) Priceline.com's Name-
Your-Price Reverse Auctions; and (3) Pitney Bowes's Internet
postage delivery system.
17 3
According to some commentators, issuing business methods
patents will only hurt competition by putting previously widely used
technologies out of reach of those companies who cannot afford the
licensing fees to use the method."' At the same time, allowing
business methods patents may permit inept Internet companies to
stay in business merely because they own certain patents.'
V. Trade Secrets
A trade secret is commercially valuable information that is
guarded from disclosure and is not general knowledge.'76 The
recipe for making Coca-Cola is a famous example of a trade
secret.' Generally, state law governs trade secrets providing civil
remedies for misappropriation of the trade secrets.78 Trade secrets
are most frequently misappropriated in two ways: (1) an employee
wrongfully uses or discloses such secrets or (2) a competitor
wrongfully obtains them.
Unlike other areas of intellectual property law, the Internet
explosion has created few new issues for trade secret law. It has,
however, facilitated the disclosure of trade secrets by disgruntled
employees and the theft of trade secrets by competitors.79
172. See id.
173. See id. at 27-30.
174. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Essay: Are Business Method Patents Bad
for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 270-71, 275
(2000) (based on a speech given at Santa Clara University School of Law); Wiese,
supra note 171, at 26-27.
175. See Dreyfuss, supra note 174, at 270.
176. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1. See Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading
Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996
U. ILL. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1996); Ryan Lambrecht, Note, Trade Secrets and the
Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 REV.
LITIG. 317, 320-23 (1999) (providing the elements of trade secrets recognized by
most states).
177. See Atkins, supra note 176, at 1152.
178. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §§ 2-4. See Lambrecht, supra note 176, at 321-
23.
179. See George J. Moscarino & Michael R. Shumaker, Changing Times,
Changing Crimes: The Criminal's Newest Weapon and the U.S.'s Response, 16
DICK. J. INT'L. L. 597, 600 (1998) (In 1989, Carnegie-Mellon University's
Computer Emergency Response Team received 132 reports of illegal computer
entries. See id. By 1995, the number of calls received jumped by 1800%. See id.).
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Congress enacted the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 to prohibit
the theft of trade secrets and provide criminal penalties for
violations; the statute does not provide any civil remedies."8 The
Act broadly defines theft to include all types of conversion of trade
secrets including:
1. stealing, obtaining by fraud, or concealing such
information;
2. copying, duplicating, sketching, drawing, photographing,
downloading, uploading, photo-copying, or mailing such
information without authorization; and
3. purchasing or possessing a trade secret with knowledge
that it has been stolen."'
The Act punishes thefts of trade secrets, as well as attempts and
conspiracies to steal secrets, with fines of up to $500,000, imprison-
ment for up to ten years, or both.1 12 Organizations that violate the




Contract law provides a means of binding parties to an
agreement. Contracts are primarily governed by state common law.
The sale of personal property is a large part of commercial activity;
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code, or U.C.C.)
governs such sales in all states except Louisiana.'9 A sale consists of
the passing of title to goods from seller to buyer for a price. A contract
for sale of goods includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to
sell goods at a future time.
See Atkins, supra note 176, at 1169-70 (noting that even constant employee
supervision cannot eliminate the risk that a trade secret may be made public on the
Internet).
180. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488
(1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2001)). See Moscarino & Shumaker, supra
note 179 at 598.
181. 18 U.S.C. 1832 (2001) (emphasis added).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See John D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
1.7, at 17-18 (4th ed. 1998). Ultimately, the U.C.C. was passed by every state
except Louisiana. See id.
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B. Problems Applying Contract and Sale Law to E-commerce
As with other areas of law, contract law is lagging behind the
technology of the Internet.' Electronic consumer transactions on
the Internet raise questions about contract authenticity, bargaining
power, enforceability, and even the applicability of current U.C.C.
provisions.'86 Moreover, questions have arisen whether the U.C.C.,
common law, or both apply to Internet business transactions and
computer software purchases or licenses.'
In particular, software transactions did not fall squarely within
the U.C.C.'s definition of a "good"'" or of a "sale." Thus, the stage
was set for a line of cases known as the "shrinkwrap cases," in
which the main issue was whether the buyer was bound to the
seller's terms written on the box or shrinkwrap in which the
software was packaged. 9 In deciding these cases, each court either
explicitly or implicitly determined that the U.C.C. applied to
software transactions.' 9° By analogy, the shrinkwrap cases provided
185. See John Anecki, Comment, Selling in Cyberspace: Electronic Commerce
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 33 GONz. L. REV. 395 (1997/1998) (citing
HENRY PERRITr, LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 2 (1996)).
186. See Pratik A. Shah, The Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85 (2000); Jody Storm Gale, Note, Service Over the
"Net": Principles of Contract Law in Conflict, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567 (1999);
Zachary M. Harrison, Note, Just Click Here: Article 2B's Failure to Guarantee
Adequate Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 907 (1998). Additionally, the enforceability of bilateral
cyberspace contracts may be suspect for a lack of privity. See Robert P. Merges,
The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of
On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 115, 199-120 (1997). Because the
Internet facilitates transactions, it is possible for information rights to be bought
and sold regularly, creating a long chain of possession. See Merges, supra. If one
of the links in the chain lacks privity, it may foreclose a potential cause of action
for the titleholder at the end. See Merges, supra.
187. See Gale, supra note 186, at 570.
188. See id. (discussing whether software qualifies as a tangible, movable good).
A good is defined, in part, by the U.C.C. as "all things ... which are movable at the
time of... contract for sale .. " U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1998). Questions remain as
to whether a web page falls within the definition of a good. See Gale, supra note
186, at 582.
189. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (following the
District Court in applying the U.C.C. to software sales and holding that shrinkwrap
licenses were enforceable); Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939
F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (assuming that software was a good as defined by the U.C.C.
and holding that the terms of the box-top license did not become part of the
parties' complete and final agreement). See Gale, supra note 186, at 571-75
(providing a more comprehensive analysis of these and other shrinkwrap cases).
190. Compare ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447 (software governed by U.C.C.), and Step-
Saver Data Systems, 939 F.2d 91 (software governed by U.C.C.), with Anecki,
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insight into judicial decisions affecting the purchase of software
over the Internet. Typically, before such a transaction is consum-
mated, the buyer must click on a button that then displays the terms
of the agreement.9 ' Usually, the buyer must agree to those terms
before the transaction is complete, thereby forming a contract with
the company.'" Thus, these "clickwrap" licenses operate in the
same way as their shrinkwrap counterparts.
93
Another issue highlighted by the shrinkwrap cases was the
hybrid nature of Internet transactions. Traditionally, sales were
made for either goods or services.'94 Often a transaction involves
goods and services, making it difficult to know whether the U.C.C.
or common law applies.9  Transactions involving customized
software and the Internet have further confounded the delineation
between goods and services. '96
C. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(U.C.I. T.A.)
The dramatic increase in the number and value of Internet
transactions coupled with uncertainty about the applicability of the
U.C.C. and common law, prompted the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to promulgate
the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act
("U.C.I.T.A.") in 1999' 9 to provide a comprehensive set of rules for
supra note 185, at 399 (stating that it remains unclear whether courts will apply the
U.C.C. to software sales).
191. See Harrison, supra note 186, at 912.
192. See id.
193. Both types of licenses threaten consumer rights by limiting warranties and
the buyer's rights. See id. at 910, 912. Moreover, based on court opinions, the
enforceability of clickwrap licenses appears to be very fact specific. See id. at 912-
13.
194. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
1.7, at 17-18 (4th ed. 1998).
195. Courts vary in their methods for analyzing such "mixed" or "hybrid"
contracts. For a review of the dominant tests used by courts, see Anecki, supra
note 185, at 399-400.
196. See Gale, supra note 186, at 577-80. One aspect of the problem is that
when the U.C.C. was drafted and later enacted by the states, the U.S. economy
was primarily goods-based. See Shah, supra note 186, at 85. Over the years, the
economy has shifted to a service-based system with the Internet providing a good
example of the synergy between goods and services. See id.
197. Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita200.htm (last visited May 18, 2001). See Shah, supra note
186, at 85-88. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") in conjunction with the American Law Institute ("ALl") drafted
and passed proposed changes to the U.C.C.. See id. After this lengthy process, the
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computer information transactions. To date, it has been adopted by
only two states and introduced in eight other states.1 98
More specifically, Article 2B was conceived in 1995 to address
the contracting challenges the Internet and other computer
technologies presented.' 99 Although the scope of Article 2B had
included all information and digital data,2°° because of intense
lobbying pressure, 20' U.C.I.T.A. today covers only computer
inform-ation transactions.2°2 The U.C.I.T.A. defines a "computer
information transaction" as "an agreement or the performance of it
to create, modify, transfer, or license computer information or
informational rights in computer information., 203  This definition
would include transfers of computer programs or multimedia
products, software and multimedia development contracts, and
contracts to obtain information for use in a program or multimedia
product.' 4 U.C.I.T.A. also governs access contracts, which are
contracts to enter the information system of another to obtain
changes are then sent to the fifty states to be individually enacted by each state
government. See id. Recognizing a need to update the 1940's era U.C.C. with
language reflecting the technologies of 2000, the NCCUSL and ALl began drafting
U.C.C. Article 2B. See id. Article 2B, however, faced stiff opposition during the
drafting process from government agencies, private industry, and academics alike.
See id. As a result, in April 1999, ALI pulled out of the drafting process. Just
three months later, NCCUSL passed what was once proposed U.C.C. Article 2B as
U.C.I.T.A., paving the way for U.C.I.T.A. to go before each of the fifty states for
approval. See id. See also Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised
Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683
(1999) (providing a comprehensive, first-hand account of the process surrounding
the proposed U.C.C. revisions. The author served initially as an observer working
with the American Bar Association and later as an associate reporter for the
Article 2 Drafting Committee.).
198. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law,
Introduction and Adoptions of Uniform Acts (last visited May 9, 2001) at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last
visited May 29, 2001).
199. See Shah, supra note 186, at 86. For a copy of the act, see National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and
Model Acts: Official Site at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm (last
visited May 10, 2001).
200. See Shah, supra note 186, at 88 n.22.
201. See id. at 87 n.12 (listing the various private organizations, including the
Recording Industry Association of America and the Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc., that objected to the scope of Article 2B.).
202. U.C.I.T.A. § 103 (2001). See id. at 88 n.22. U.C.I.T.A. was amended in
February 2000. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts: Official Site at http://www.law.upenn.edu
/bll/ulc/ulc frame.htm (last visited May 10, 2001).
203. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(11) (2001).
204. U.C.I.T.A. § 102, comment 9 (2001).
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information or use that information system for specific purposes.
In addition, U.C.I.T.A. applies to support and service contracts.
6
Thus, examples of computer information transactions include
contracts to acquire software, online access services and content,
books and databases on CD-ROM, and non-trivial software
elements embedded in goods. U.C.I.T.A. would also apply to
storage devices, such as disks and CD's that exist only to hold
computer information. U.C.I.T.A. does not govern contracts or
licenses for the traditional distribution of movies, books, magazines,
or newspapers; it would, however, apply to online books, music,
and databases.207 The parties' agree-ment to communicate in digital
form does not bring a transaction within a computer information
transaction. For example, a contract for an airline ticket is not a
computer information transaction because the ticket may be
represented in digital form. In this case, the subject matter of the
contract is a service: air transportation.2
U.C.I.T.A. adapts Article 2 and common law contract
provisions to the special needs and nature of computer information
trans-actions.2°  U.C.I.T.A. includes provisions dealing with
formation, unconscionability, good faith, interpretation, warranties,
risk of loss, transfer of contractual rights, financing arrangements,
performance, termination and remedies. Most of these provi-
sions are default rules that the parties may change.1
Critics of U.C.I.T.A. claim the act has created new issues in its
attempts to solve previously nagging ones.12 For example, under
the U.C.C., courts had difficulty determining when a software
transaction was complete."3  However, many argue that the
205. U.C.I.T.A. §§ 102(a)(1), 103, comment 2 (2001).
206. U.C.I.T.A. § 103, comment 2 (2001).
207. See Shah, supra note 186, at 88-89 (providing further explanation and
examples of U.C.I.T.A.'s scope).
208. U.C.I.T.A. § 102, comment 9 (2001).
209. U.C.I.T.A., Prefatory Note.
210. Id.
211. Overview of U.C.I.T.A., National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org/uniformactoverview/uniformacts-ov-
ucita .htm. (last visited Aug. 10, 2000).
212. The Attorneys General of twenty-four states wrote a letter to the
NCCUSL urging it not to adopt the U.C.I.T.A. until problems they had identified
had been addressed, http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/agoppltr.html (last visited
May 10, 2001); http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/agopltr2.html (last visited May 10,
2001). The Bureaus of Consumer Protection and Competition and the Policy
Planning Office of the Federal Trade Commission wrote a letter to the NCCUSL
expressing a number of concerns when the conference was considering adoption of
the U.C.I.T.A.. http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.htm (last visited May 10, 2001).
213. Assent may be determined by a traditional offeror/offeree approach or by
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U.C.I.T.A. has not remedied the situation because under
U.C.I.T.A., assent is too easily manifested and may be recognized
even through inaction."4 Based on these concerns, opponents claim
that U.C.I.T.A. jeopardizes a consumer's freedom to contract5
One of the most frequently criticized provisions of the
U.C.I.T.A. is its rule permitting shrink-wrapped and clickable
contractual provisions to be disclosed after the consumer has paid
for the software and opens the package. The U.C.I.T.A. permits a
mass marketed shrinkwrap license 16 if: (1) the purchaser had
reason to know that more terms would be coming; (2) the purchaser
is given a right to return the product if he objects to the terms; (3)
the right of return is cost-free; and (4) the license does not alter
terms to which the parties had actually agreed.217 The delayed
disclosure approach of U.C.I.T.A. applies to all terms, including
warranty disclaimers, remedy limitations, and restrictions on
transfer and use. Permitting the withholding of warranty
information until after the sale conflicts with the approach of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 9
Perhaps a more troubling issue is the potential for clickwrap
agreements to supersede copyright laws. Currently, copyright laws
balance an author's rights to reproduce, distribute and display
the conduct of the parties. See Gale, supra note 186, at 581. Either way,
shrinkwrap and click-wrap licenses make it difficult to judge assent. See id.
214. See Shah, supra note 186, at 91-93 (claiming that consumers may assent to
terms including opt-out clauses, where the U.C.I.T.A. would not apply. The
possibilities are high for such confusion because U.C.I.T.A.'s requirement that opt-
out clauses be "conspicuous" is not all that stringent.); Gale, supra note 186, at
584-585; Harrison, supra note 186, at 937-38 (criticizing Article 2B for allowing
consumers to consent to agreements on the Internet merely by having had the
"opportunity to review" the terms of a license, even if they never did, but began
using the information available).
215. See generally Gail E. Evans, Opportunity Costs of Globalizing Information
Licenses: Embedding Consumer Rights within the Legislative Framework for
Information Contracts, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 267
(criticizing Article 2B's unfairness to consumers and proposing a transnational
approach to licensing practices). See also Shah, supra note 186, at 93-96 (arguing
that U.C.I.T.A. threatens to bind consumers to unwanted waivers of warranties,
and choice of forum and law provisions); Gale, supra note 186, at 584-586
(predicting that because of burdensome rejection requirements for consumers,
vendors will be tempted to ship non-conforming goods, and then bind
unsuspecting consumers to mandatory arbitration clauses); Harrison, supra note
186, at 942-45 (finding that Article 2B makes it too easy for consumers to assent
without thoughtfully committing to the agreement).
216. U.C.I.T.A. §§ 102(a)(44), 102(a)(45) (2001).
217. U.C.I.T.A. § 209 (2001).
218. Id.
219. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 - 2312
(2001)).
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against the public's interest in enjoying the work.22°  Online
licensing agreements have begun to dictate terms regarding a
purchaser's right to distribute or copy the information bought.
Now, an area traditionally governed by copyright law, may be
undermined by online contracts under U.C.I.T.A., thus bypassing
federal statutes.222 Essentially, it has been argued, U.C.I.T.A.
encourages an online vendor "to write [its] own copyright law, in
other words, to privately legislate its own intellectual property
rights. ' '223 The debate continues as to whether federal copyright
laws should preempt such contracts.224
D. U.E.TA. and E-Sign
While U.C.I.T.A. largely addresses software licensing, many
questions remained as to the enforceability of contracts made
entirely electronically either through the Internet or e-mail because
of the writing requirements under contract and sales law (statute of
frauds).225 In response, the NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act ("U.E.T.A.") in July 1999, which has
been adopted by more than thirty states and introduced in most
other states. 6 The purpose of the Act is to give full effect to
electronic contracts, encourage their widespread use, and develop a
uniform legal framework for their implementation. 7 U.E.T.A.
220. See supra notes 60-131 and accompanying text.
221. See Shah, supra note 186, at 97.
222. See Evans, supra note 215, at 289-91 (arguing that such U.C.I.T.A.
contracts effectively create monopolies on information); Shah, supra note 186, at
97-104.
223. See Evans, supra note 215, at 290.
224. See Shah, supra note 186, at 98-102 (comparing the "symbiotic" view
where U.C.I.T.A. and copyright law work together against the preemptive view
premised on the invocation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution in
order to protect existing federal copyright laws).
225. See generally R.J. Robertson, Jr., Electronic Commerce on the Internet and
the Statute of Frauds, 49 S.C. L. REV. 787 (1998) (though now dated by the passage
of U.E.T.A. in the states and E-SIGN by Congress, this article describes earlier
concerns about conducting electronic commerce within a legal framework
designed for paper).
226. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Introductions and Adoptions of Uniform Acts, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl
/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited May 29, 2001). For a
copy of the Act, see National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, http://www.law.upenn.edu
/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm (last visited May 10, 2001). See generally Shea C. Meehan,
Comment, Consumer Protection Law and the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act
(U.E.T.A.): Why States Should Adopt U.E.T.A. as Drafted, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 563
(2000) (discussing the scope and specific provisions of U.E.T.A.).
227. See UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 6, Comment 1 (1999).
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protects and enforces electronic signatures and contracts despite
the statute of frauds. 22 Section 7 of U.E.T.A. accomplishes this by
providing:
(1) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
(2) A contract may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because an electronic record was
used in its formation.
(3) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic
record satisfies the law.
(4) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature
satisfies the law.
U.E.T.A. further validates contracts formed by machines func-
tioning as electronic agents for parties to a transaction: "A contract
may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of the parties,
even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic
agents' actions or the resulting terms and agreements., 229 The Act
excludes from its coverage wills, codicils, and testamentary trusts as
well as all Articles of the U.C.C. except Articles 2 and 2A.23°
Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act ("E-Sign") in 2000.231 The Act, which uses
language very similar to U.E.T.A.'s language, makes electronic
records and signatures valid and enforceable across the United
States.232 The Act defines transactions quite broadly to include the
sale, lease, exchange, and licensing of personal property and
services, as well as the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of
any interest in real property.233 E-Sign defines an electronic record
as "a contract or other record created, generated, sent,
228. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7. Based on the Act's
definitions of electronic, electronic record, and electronic signature, Internet and
e-mail transactions are fully enforceable. See id. §§ 2(5)-(8). See also Meehan,
supra note 226, at 567-68.
229. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 14.
230. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3. See also Meehan, supra
note 226, at 568-69.
231. Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 164 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001 -
7006 (2001)). The act took effect on October 1, 2000, subject to certain exceptions,
pursuant to § 107 of Act regarding the electronic record retention provisions of the
Act.
232. Compare UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7, with
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT § 101, 15
U.S.C. § 7001 (2001).
233. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT §
106(13), 15 U.S.C. § 7006(13) (hereinafter ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE ACT).
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communicated, received, or stored by electronic means. ' 234  It
defines an electronic signature as "an electronic sound, symbol, or
process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other
record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign
the record., 235 Like U.E.T.A., E-Sign ensures that Internet and e-
mail agreements will not be unenforceable based on the statute of
frauds by providing:
1. a signature, contract, or other record relating to such
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and
2. a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied
legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an
electronic signature or electronic record was used in its
formation. 236
To protect consumers, E-Sign provides that consumers must
electronically consent to conducting transactions with electronic
records after being informed of the types of hardware and software
required. 7 Prior to consent, consumers must also receive a "clear
and conspicuous, 238 statement informing consumers of their right to:
(1) have the record provided on paper or in non-electronic form;
(2) receive paper copies of the electronic record after consenting to
electronic records; and (3) withdraw consent to receiving electronic
records.239
As defined by E-Sign, an electronic agent is a computer
program or other automated means used independently to initiate
an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole
or in part without review or action by an individual at the time of
the action or response.2" The Act validates contracts or other
records relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce formed by electronic agents so long as the action of each
electronic agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.241
E-Sign specifically excludes certain transactions, including (1)
wills, codicils, and testamentary trusts; (2) adoptions, divorces, and
other matters of family law; and (3) the Uniform Commercial Code
234. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ACT § 106(4), 15 U.S.C. § 7006(4).
235. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ACT § 106(5), 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5).
236. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ACT § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a).
237. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ACT §§ 101(c); 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(2), (c).
238. "Clear and conspicuous" is not defined in the Act.
239. For a complete list of consumer's rights under the Act, see ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES ACT § 101(a)(2), (c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(2), (c)(1) (2001).
240. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES Act § 106(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7006(3).
241. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AcT § 101(h), 15 U.S.C. § 7001(h).
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other than sales and leases of goods.2 It also excludes notices of
(1) cancellation or termination of utility services (including water,
heat, and power); (2) default, acceleration, repossession, fore-
closure, or eviction, or the right to cure, under a credit agreement
secured by, or a rental agreement for, a primary residence of an
individual; (3) the cancellation or termination of health insurance
or benefits or life insurance benefits (excluding annuities); or (4)
recall of a product, or material failure of a product, that risks
endangering health or safety. 3
As evidence of Congress's respect for U.E.T.A. and the states
that have made it law, U.E.T.A. is not generally preempted by E-
Sign.2" State laws governing electronic transactions that are not
technology neutral, however, are preempted by E-Sign.2 5 More
than forty states have laws affecting electronic transactions. 6 Some
states have adopted laws specifying acceptable technologies. 7
As technology continues to leap forward, most agree that
uniformity among the laws designed to address those challenges is
the key to success and stability. With respect to electronic
signatures, E-Sign has ensured national recognition of electronic
contracts and signatures. However, critics are concerned that the
legislation's "technology neutral" position may not relieve the
financial and convenience concerns of people doing business with
parties using varied technologies for electronic records and
2481signatures.
24
242. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ACT § 103(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7003(a).
243. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ACT § 103(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7003(b).
244. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ACT § 102(a)(1), 15 U.S.C 7002(a)(1).
245. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES ACT § 102(a)(2)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(2)
(A)(ii).
246. See W. Everett Lupton, Comment, The Digital Signature: Your Identity by
the Numbers, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 35 (Fall 1999), available at http://www.
richmond.edu/jolt/v6i2/note2.html (last visited May 10, 2001) (providing a survey
of current state laws and the technology behind electronic transactions and
security).
247. For example, Utah has passed legislation requiring the use of a specific
type of digital (not electronic) signature. See id. 36.
248. See Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Recent Developments in Digital Signature
Legislation and Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 463, 473-480
(1999). Though written before E-Sign was passed, this article raises questions
about the costs of technologically inconsistent laws among the states designed to
regulate electronic commerce. Moreover, the article suggests that federal
legislation could eliminate such problems by specifying acceptable technologies for
electronic signatures and their authentication.
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E. Non-Compete Agreements
Employees' covenants not to compete (agreements to refrain
from a particular trade, profession, or business) are enforceable if
(1) the purpose of the restraint is to protect a property interest of
the promisee and (2) the restraint is no more extensive than is
reasonably necessary to protect that interest."9 The reasonableness
of the restraint depends on the geographic area the restraint covers,
the period for which it is to be effective, and the hardship it imposes
on the employee and the public.2 0 A benchmark for time in many
of these agreements has been one year.5
Due to the rapid evolution of business practices in the Internet
industry, it has been argued that non-compete agreements for
Internet company employees need their own rules. For instance, a
period of time that is reasonable for a conventional company might
be unreasonable for an Internet company. In Earthweb, Inc. v.
Schlack,252 the courts were faced with this issue, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a district
court decision striking down a one-year non-compete agreement for
an Internet employee because it found the time period too long
given the "dynamic nature of [the Internet] industry.
253
Emphasizing its point, the district court then concluded that
"[w]hen measured against the IT [information technology] industry
in the Internet environment, a one-year hiatus from the workforce
is several generations, if not an eternity.,
25 4
National Business Services, Inc. v. Wright,255 which was decided
a year before Earthweb, addressed the geographic scope of an
Internet non-compete agreement, upholding a one-year time
restriction and a territorial clause that prevented the employee
from taking another Internet-related job anywhere in the United
States.2 6 The court stated: "[tiransactions involving the Internet,
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(a) (1981). See Beverly
Garofalo & Mitchell L. Fishberg, Noncompete Agreements, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 17,
2000, at B7.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 188, comment d (1981).
251. Id., comment g.
252. 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), remanded on other grounds, 205 F.3d
1322, 2000 WL 232057 (2d Cir., 2000).
253. Id. at 313.
254. Id. at 316.
255. 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
256. Id. at 709.
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unlike traditional 'sales territory' cases, are not limited by state
boundaries."
257
Some experts in the field are urging companies and their
lawyers to rethink their non-compete agreements. 28  Suggestions
include: (1) limit the number of people asked to sign a non-
compete agreement, which adds credibility to the importance of the
measure; (2) shorten time restrictions from one year to three to six
months; and (3) demonstrate the agreement's fairness by providing
the employee with additional consideration for the time in which
the non-compete is honored. 9
F. Business-to-Business Marketplaces
In an effort to compete and cash in on the profits from the
success of online marketplaces, businesses are now joining together
to form their own cyber markets.260 Known as business-to-business
("B2B") marketplaces, these sites, which are typically developed by
companies within an industry, allow the companies to trade online
for supplies and finished products.26' B2B sites are being developed
by companies in a variety of industries producing everything from
262cars to planes to meats.
The companies responsible for the sites say the B2Bs will
create effective, instantaneous communication allowing for paper-
less sales without middlemen.263 In the end, the companies argue
257. Id. at 708.
258. See Beverly Garofalo & Mitchell L. Fishberg, Noncompete Agreements,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 17, 2000, at B7.
259. See id.
260. By 2004, some estimates have 17% of business-to-business transactions
totaling $2.7 trillion occurring online. See Stephanie Stoughton, Killer Bs Business
to Business Exchanges Are the New Buzz in Internet Commerce, Transforming the
Marketplace for Parts, Supplies, and Goods. But the Exchanges Could Come Back
to Sting Traditional Supply Chains, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2000, at C6.
261. See David Leonhardt, Business-Exchange Sites Raise Questions for
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, http://searchl.nytimes.com/searchl/daily/bin
/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+12084+0+wAAA+B2B (last visited Aug. 10,
2000).
262. See Leonhardt, supra note 261 (Big Three automakers plan for site
Covisint); Stoughton, supra note 260 (defense and aerospace contractor's B2B site
plans); Brian Sullivan, Antitrust, Monopoly Fears Haunt B-to-B Exchanges. Web
site developed by meat companies latest to face questions of price fixing.,
COMPUTERWORLD, May 22, 2000, at 42 (six major meat companies plan B2B). For
a closer look at how the Big Three's site might work, see Andrea Foster, Business-
to-Business Alliances Raise Antitrust Concerns, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 2000, at 5.
263. See Leonhardt, supra note 261.
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that B2Bs will result in cheaper prices for consumers who will
benefit from increased competition and lower transaction costs.
26
However, these B2B sites, many of which are still on the
drawing board, have drawn the attention of the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the United States Department of
Justice.2 The FTC is concerned that the B2Bs are closely aligning
major companies traditionally in competition with each other.26
Critics assert B2Bs will expose companies to sensitive pricing
information, manufacturing outputs, and inventory numbers of
their competitors, raising price-fixing, collusion, and other antitrust
267issues. Moreover, some worry that B2Bs will operate to exclude
some competitors.2' Recently, Ford announced that the "Big
Three" automakers will delay launching their B2Bs as the FTC
investigates the antitrust concerns of B2Bs.
269
To combat these concerns, attorneys are suggesting such
solutions as: (1) keep any B2B exchange as independent as possible
from the companies participating in it;270 (2) allow other companies
to join;271 (3) set clear policies against collusion;2 2 and (4) use
firewalls or encryption to maintain confidential communications
between companies.273
G. Electronic Cash
Much like the hype surrounding point-of-sale ("POS")
transactions in the early 1980s, electronic currencies are not popular
264. See id. One survey found that companies expect to save nine percent on
procurement costs because of Internet based business-to-business exchanges. See
Greta Steyn, Internet Procurement Raises Fears of Collusions, Bus. DAY, May 17,
2000, at 2.
265. See Sullivan, supra note 262.
266. See Leonhardt, supra note 261 (citing some that fear B2B exchanges will
create de facto cartels).
267. See Jeffrey P. Weingart & Jennifer L. Gray, B2B Internet Marketplaces,
NAT'L L.J., June 26, 2000, at Bll.
268. See id. In addition, questions remain about taxation, regulation, and
registration for international exchanges. See Steyn, supra note 264.
269. See Sullivan, supra note 262.
270. See Leonhardt, supra note 261. For example, the board members for a
steel exchange, known as Metalsite, see only aggregate data because the board
members also work for the individual companies that own the site. See id. Others
recommend having the site run by a third party entirely unrelated to the
companies participating in the exchange. See Sullivan, supra note 262.
271. See Dan Carney, E-Exchanges May Keep Trustbusters Busy, Bus. WK.,
May 1, 2000, at 52.
272. See id.
273. See Steyn, supra note 264. See generally Sullivan, supra note 262.
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among consumers.274 Electronic currencies take several different
forms,275 but at their core they would enable online purchases to be
made without using credit cards.276 Upon the full development of
electronic currencies, target uses would be for very small value
transactions (i.e., less than a few dollars), 277 and web sites that
charge a small one-time fee to download files.
The biggest hurdle for these entrepreneurs has not been the
legalities or enforceability of such payment systems, but the low
demand for electronic currencies. Though technological develop-
ments would indicate people are eager for a more convenient and
anonymous method of buying goods online, statistics show
otherwise. 79 Most people prefer the flexibility that comes with
using personal checks. 280 Furthermore, when purchases are made
online, consumers feel comfortable paying with credit cards. 8
Consequently, most cyber currency companies are bankrupt,
struggling, or focusing the lion's share of their business on other
Internet technologies.282
274. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition
between Established and Emerging Electronic Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 675, 688 (1999); Peter Wayner, Electronic Cash for the Net Fails to
Catch On, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB (Nov. 28, 1998)
http://searchl.nytimes.com/searchi/daily/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+
1249+15+wAAA+cybercash (last visited Aug. 10, 2000). But see John Markoff,
Internet Concern Plans System for Small Online Transactions, N.Y. TIMES ON THE
WEB, (Mar. 8, 1999) at http://nytimes.com (last visited Aug. 10, 2000) (citing
estimates that electronic cash systems will account for 25% of all Internet
purchases by 2002).
275. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructures for
Electronic Payment Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 29-30
(describing a typical electronic payment transaction); Bryan S. Schultz, Electronic
Money, Internet Commerce and the Right to Financial Privacy: A Call for New
Federal Guidelines, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 785 (1999) (describing an electronic
cash transaction); see Winn, supra note 274, at 691-701.
276. See Perritt, supra note 275, at 3-4.
277. See Markoff, supra 274.
278. See Winn, supra note 274, at 693 (citing the fact that the demand for pay-
per-view web sites has not necessitated the need for electronic cash system).
279. Personal checks remain the most popular among consumers, and their
usage continues to increase. See id. at 682.
280. See id. at 683.
281. See id. at 687 (citing the consumer protections and minimal risk associated
with credit cards); Wayner, supra note 274 (quoting Amazon corn which says it will
even pay for the $50 deductible not paid by credit card issuers in the event of fraud
reported by the consumer). Though trouble may be looming for credit card
purchases online, they account for only two percent of card transactions, but for
50% of reported fraud. See Winn, supra note 274. Those numbers may cause
merchants to become more receptive to a different electronic payment system.
282. See Winn, supra note 274, at 691-94, 698-99; Wayner, supra note 274
(finding that even cyber money stalwart Cybercash generates most of its income
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Although current Internet transactions are not usually made
with electronic currencies, experts believe that e-cash will soon
grow in use and popularity."3 If and when that time arrives, legal
issues may arise. For now, consumer privacy, proper authen-
tication, and the risk of forgeries seem to be the areas of greatest
concern2 4 With the passage U.E.T.A., U.C.I.T.A. and E-Sign,
authentication would seem to be less of an issue, as those measures
validated the use of electronic transactions and signatures.-
Consumer privacy has also received frenzied attention, though little
regulation over online financial transactions has been
promulgated. 285
H. Conflict of Laws
A complex issue in "real space," the conflict of laws is even
more complicated in cyberspace.26 Because the Internet is
transnational, legitimate arguments can be made that any conflict of
laws analysis must be international in scope.2 8
Traditionally, United States courts determined which
jurisdiction's substantive law was applicable based on the geo-
graphic area where the contract was formed.2' Later, a test was
developed based on the "most significant relationship," which was
through technology that protects credit card transactions).
283. See Winn, supra note 274, at 688 (noting almost two decades after their
introduction, debit cards were widely used by consumers at POS locations, such as
the grocery store). Looking ahead, companies are working toward providing
consumers with a single web site where they can pay their monthly bills, see Winn,
supra note 274, at 699, which may be necessary to force Americans to throw away
their checkbooks. See id.
284. See Perritt, supra note 275.
285. See Schultz, supra note 275 (proposing that new federal regulations must
be passed to protect consumer's privacy rights when conducting Internet
transactions). But see Perritt, supra note 275 (addressing the benefit that
electronic cash provides anonymous purchasing power after its initial
configuration); Winn, supra note 274, at 692-93 (noting that Digicash, not
bankrupt, was founded on the idea that consumers would flock to an electronic
cash system that guaranteed anynonimity). "[Clonsumers are not sufficiently
motivated by privacy concerns to create the demand that DigiCash's early
promoters expected." See Winn, supra.
286. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199
(1998); Aristotle G. Mirzaian, Y2K Who Cares? We Have Bigger Problems:
Choice of Law in Electronic Contracts, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 20 (Winter 1999/
2000), available at http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i4/article3.html (last visited May
10, 2001); Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1996) (hereinafter Conflicts).
287. See Goldsmith, supra note 286.
288. See Mirzaian, supra note 286, T 107-10.
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designed to weigh various factors before determining which state's
law applied.289
The Internet creates problems for either analysis because it is
difficult to define: (1) where a transaction is "located" or formed;
(2) where its effects are felt; and (3) where the harm actually
occurs. Some commentators recommend federal laws to remedy
substantive law conflicts within the United States,2 ° multinational
treaties for transnational conflicts, 29 1 or a lex mercatoria92 approach
for cyberspace contracts similar to the specialized merchant courts
established centuries ago. Others, however, suggest that the
difficulty of applying current conflict of law frameworks to the
Internet is overblown. 3 They suggest that the issues in cyberspace
manifest themselves comparably in other areas of law in which the
accepted conflict of laws analyses have been successfully applied.
Nevertheless, many authorities recommend that the parties to a
contract over the Internet write an enforceable choice of law
provision into the electronic contract.
29
VII. Privacy and the Internet
Technology has greatly increased the ability of online
companies to collect, store, transfer, and analyze vast quantities of
data about consumers who visit their web sites. The Internet's
impact on privacy rights has generated considerable public aware-
ness and consumer concern about online privacy. Almost daily,
news stories appear detailing the latest Internet privacy problem.96
289. See id. 91 111-22 (explaining "most significant relationship test and
others).
290. See id. I 62-64.
291. See id. I 136-39; Conflicts, supra note 286, at 110-11.
292. Lex Mercatoria is the law of merchants or commercial law. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 923 (7th ed. 1999). See Mirzaian, supra note 286, 91 133-35;
Conflicts, supra note 286, at 108-10 (The author also suggests applying admiralty
law or choice of law as applied to Antartica.).
293. See Goldsmith, supra note 286.
294. See id.
295. See Goldsmith, supra note 286, at 1208; Mirzaian, supra note 286, IT 123-
24; Conflicts, supra note 286, 97-102.
296. See e.g., Failed Dot-Corns May Be Selling Your Privacy Information, N.Y.
TIMES ON THE WEB (July 1, 2000), http://search3.nytimes.com/search/daily/bin
/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+11979+25+wAAA+privacy (last visited Aug.
10, 2000) (reporting that some bankrupt Internet companies allegedly sold
personal information about their former customers); Bob Tedeschi, DoubleClick
Reverses on Using Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Mar. 2, 2000, at B10,
http://search3.nytimes.com/search/daily/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+
10234+64+wAAA+privacy (last visited Aug. 18, 2000) (describing DoublClick's
decision not to associate personal information with other "anonymously collected"
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While the specific issues are sometimes intricately technical or
legal, in general Internet privacy concerns consist of two distinct
branches: (1) protection regarding the collection, use, and accuracy
of "personal identifiable information"" on the Internet; and (2)
freedom from unwanted governmental intrusion through the
Internet.
A. Protection of Personal Identifiable Information on the Internet
Statistics show that most Internet users fear exploitation of
their personal information including their names, phone numbers,
home addresses, credit card information, banking information and
social security numbers.298 Though most attention is given to the
involuntary means by which personal identifiable information is
obtained, Internet users regularly provide such data voluntarily
through online purchases, registrations, applications, and surveys."
However, even when a person voluntarily provides the information,
most companies do not clearly indicate how that data will be used.3"
As a result, some Internet users regularly lie when filling out such
questionnaires to avoid the privacy risks.3°1
The public, academics, and regulators consider the involuntary
collection of personal information even more troubling. One
method of data capture is through the use of "cookies. ' '3° Under
this method, a text file is placed on a user's computer hard drive by
Internet data); Toy Site Sued Over Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB
(Aug. 4, 2000) (describing a class-action lawsuit alleging that Toys 'R Us Inc.
violated its own privacy policy) http://search3.nytimes.com/search/daily/bin/fast
web?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+12687+3+wAAA+privacy (last visited Aug. 10,
2000).
297. See Jonathan P. Cody, Comment, Protecting Privacy over the Internet: Has
the Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1185 n.7
(1999).
298. Karl D. Belgum, Who Leads at Half-time?: Three Conflicting Visions of
Internet Privacy Policy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, $ 3 n.4 (1999) (citing statistics from
a poll appearing the March 1998 edition of Business Week in which 78% of
Internet users said they would use the Internet more if their privacy was
"guaranteed"), http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6il/belgum.html (last visited May
10, 2001). But see id. 5 (noting that some criticize those polls based on their
question construction).
299. See Cody, supra note 297, at 1186.
300. A 1998 survey by the Federal Trade Commission found that less than 15%
of those web sites surveyed had a posted privacy policy which would indicate to an
Internet user how the soliciting company plans to synthesize or distribute his
personal data. See Belgum, supra note 298, 11.
301. See Cody, supra note 297, at 1186.
302. See Belgum, supra note 298, 14 (explaining that cookies can also capture
the type of computer and Internet browser used).
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the web site visited.3  That file contains information about the user
that is automatically retrieved by the web site and updated each
time the user makes subsequent visits.' ° Thus, over time, the web
site compiles information about the user's preferences and personal
data. In addition, the user's "clickstream"3 5 tracks the user as he
clicks on pages within the web site and records where the user goes
before and after surfing a specific web site.30 6 Gradually, the
clickstream builds a map of where the user has been and where he
is likely to go.3°7
Whether voluntarily or involuntarily, in one study ninety-two
percent of surveyed Internet sites collect personal identifiable
information.3 8 Typically, companies use the data to build a
"profile" of their users.3°9 These profiles are then frequently sold to
advertising companies that focus marketing based on each user's
preferences.3 "0 The companies contend that consumers benefit from
the targeted marketing that presents them with goods and services
in which they are likely to be interested."' On the other hand,
many users view such information as their private property and




306. See id.; see also Kimbrelly Keigler, Note & Comment, Electronic Banking:
Security, Privacy and CRA Compliance, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 426, 436 (1998)
(describing clickstream and cookies).
307. See Belgum, supra note 298, T 14. Microsoft and Intel came under fire for
introducing unique numerical tags which identified each user of that particular
software or hardware. See id. 15. These tags, which were unknown to the users,
then enabled the companies to track the users throughout the Internet. See id.; see
also Cody, supra note 297, at 1185 n.12.
308. See Belgum, supra note 298, 11 (citing a Federal Trade Commission 1998
study).
309. See Belgum, supra note 298, 8 (explaining that a "profile" denotes the
collection, assimilation and categorization processes of a user's personal data). In
fact, a cottage industry has developed where companies collecting the data hire
outside consultants to store and analyze it. See Debra A. Valentine, Privacy on the
Internet: The Evolving Legal Landscape, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 401, 402 (2000); Cody, supra note 297, at 1188.
310. See Belgum, supra note 298, T 16; Cody, supra note 297, at 1186-87. See
generally Keigler, supra note 306 (addressing privacy concerns affecting web-based
banking and Internet banks).
311. See Valentine, supra note 309, at 402-03; Cody, supra note 297, at 1186-87.
312. See Belgum, supra note 298, TT 7 n.11, 9-12 (noting that much of the same
personal data can be found in public records, but the threat is that the Internet
makes it possible to collect the data much more easily). In addition, there is
increasing concern about the accuracy of information collected over the Internet.
See generally L. Richard Fischer, Privacy and Accuracy of Personal Information, 3
N.C. BANKING INST. 11 (1999).
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is to find a balance between an individual's right to privacy and
commercial access to personal information.3t3
1. Privacy and Intrusion by Private Parties-The United
States Constitution does not protect a person's right to privacy with
respect to intrusions by private parties."4 Moreover, the United
States has not adopted sweeping, uniform privacy laws."5 The
United States approach is essentially ad hoc, also known as
,'sectoral. '3 16
Instead, privacy rights regulating the conduct of private parties
are derived from tort law of the 20th century, although its roots can
be traced to an 1890 law review article written by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis concluding that there was a "right to be left
alone. 317  From there, well-known legal scholar William Prosser
determined that courts and legislatures had really been recognizing
four distinct privacy torts: (1) appropriation of a person's name or
likeness; (2) unreasonable public disclosure of private facts; (3)
unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of another; and (4)
unreasonable publicity that places another in a false light in the
public eye.31 8  These torts were thereafter embraced by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts319 and remain the basis for protecting
320abuse of personal information by non-governmental parties.
However, traditional privacy torts offer little protection for a
person whose privacy has been compromised on the Internet."'
313. For a social analysis of the issue, see Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in
Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the Electronic Communications
Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1998).
314. See generally Maureen S. Dorney, Privacy and the Internet, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 635 (1997) (explaining the evolution of privacy law in the
United States).
315. See id. at 638. No comprehensive federal privacy laws exist despite nearly
annual attempts since 1974 to fill the void. See Fischer, supra note 312, at 20.
316. Dorney, supra note 314, at 638-650 (describing potential state and federal
privacy laws). For example, the federal government has passed various targeted
privacy laws regulating the release of personal information regarding video rentals,
credit reports, and cable. See id.; see also Belgum, supra note 298, 24-26
(defining "sectoral" privacy laws as "piecemeal").
317. See Cody, supra note 297, at 1192 n.37 (quoting Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890)); see
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 117 at 849-50.
318. See Belgum, supra note 298, 19; Cody, supra note 297, at 1196. See
generally KEETON, ET AL., supra note 2, at 851-69 (discussing the four privacy torts
and possible defenses).
319. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §§ 652A-652E.
320. See Belgum, supra note 298, [ 19.
321. See Belgum, supra note 298, 19-23 (providing a detailed analysis of the
inherent failures of each traditional privacy tort in protecting online users); Cody,
supra note 297, at 1196 n.67 (rejecting the applicability of privacy torts to Internet
2001]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
With increasing public and political pressure to address the
dearth of available remedies for online privacy invasions, the FTC
has recommended that Congress enact legislation that would
establish a basic level of privacy protection for consumer-oriented
web sites.3 22 Under the proposal, consumer-oriented web sites that
collect personal identifying information from or about consumers
online would be required to comply with four widely accepted fair
information practices:
(1) Notice-Web sites would be required to provide
consumers clear and conspicuous notice of their
information practices, including what information they
collect, how they collect it ... whether they disclose the
information collected to other entities, and whether other
entities are collecting information through the site.
(2) Choice-Web sites would be required to offer consumers
choice as to how their personal identifying information is
used beyond the use for which the information was
provided [such as completing a purchase] ....
(3) Access-Web sites would be required to offer consumers
reasonable access to the information a Web site has
collected about them, including a reasonable opportunity
to review information and to correct inaccuracies ....
(4) Security-Web sites would be required to take reasonable
steps to protect the security of the information they collect
from consumers."
consumer concerns). But see Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and
Invisible Worlds: United States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357 (2000) (explaining that current United States
federal, state and common laws provide adequate protections for online users
concerned about privacy). In addition, it should be noted that critics of any
regulation point to the availability of "anonymyzing" sites and software that allow
consumers to stifle the collection of personal identifiable information. See
Belgum, supra note 298, T 5.
322. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES
IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (2000), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/prvacy2000.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,
2001).
323. Id. (citation omitted); see, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for
Consumer Transactions in Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulation Is
Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847 (1998); Dorney, supra note 314. For a more
esoteric analysis of the debate, see Belgum, supra note 298, which labels the parties
debating as the "dossier society pessimists" (those who fear technology will
guarantee the collection and storage of huge volumes of information about each
person), the "market opportunists" (those in favor of the commercialization of
personal information), and the "privacy peacemakers" (those who want to ensure
that Internet commerce is not thwarted by those fearful of the privacy issues). Id.
at 27. In addition, various federal laws regulating, for example, cable and credit
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2. Protecting Children-The Communications Decency Act
("CDA") of 1996 was Congress's attempt to protect children from
pornography on the Internet.3 24 The Act made it a crime to
knowingly send "obscene" or "indecent" content via a tele-
communications device to anyone under eighteen. 32' The CDA also
criminalized the knowing transmittal of "patently offensive"
material, as determined by "contemporary community standards,"
to anyone under eighteen."' However, in Reno v. ACLU,327 the
Supreme Court struck down much of the CDA as vague and overly
broad,3' holding that the CDA's language, unlike the obscenity test
in Miller v. California, 3  did not sufficiently limit the CDA's
sweep.330  Noting the CDA's legal contradictions in defining
"patently offensive"33' and that as a matter of law "indecent"
expressions are constitutionally protected,332 the Court concluded
that "the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that
miss the mark on Internet privacy. See Cody, supra note 297, at 1199-200. Most
federal privacy laws are aimed at prohibiting or limiting the distribution of
personal information, whereas Internet privacy concerns begin with the actual
collection of such information. See id. But see Dorney, supra note 314, at 646
(proposing the Cable Communications Policy Act as model for online Internet
privacy legislation). See generally Fischer, supra note 312 (issues surrounding
privacy and web-based Internet banking).
324. The CDA was enacted as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, 135; (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
223 (2000)).
325. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2001).
326. Id. § 223(d).
327. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
328. See id. at 849 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
329. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court adopted the following test for
obscene material not provided protection under the First Amendment: "(a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24
(citations omitted).
330. 521 U.S. at 872-73.
331. See id. at 873 (noting that the Government contends courts will be able to
limit the scope of "patently offensive" while Miller requires a jury to make the
determination based on "contemporary community standards"); see also Jason
Kipness, Revisiting Miller After the Striking of the Communications Decency Act: A
Proposed Set of Internet Specific Regulations for Pornography on the Information
Superhighway, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 391 (1998)
(proposing the need to redefine the Miller obscenity test in light of the Internet
and questioning the present value of "contemporary community standards" when
the Internet is available in almost every town, city and home).
332. See 521 U.S. at 874.
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adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one
another."333
In 1998, at the behest of the FTC, Congress enacted the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA"), which
became effective in April 2000.33  The purpose of the Act is to
protect children under thirteen from commercial websites that
collect, store and distribute their personal data.335 Much like
general web sites, those targeting children offered little notice or
protection of personal data.336 In fact, some sites used questionable
means to obtain such information from children.337 Children
present easy targets for obvious reasons: their lack of maturity,
understanding, and appreciation of the information they
provided.338
COPPA applies to a web site or online service directed to
children as well as to the operator of any web site or online service
that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information
from a child. COPPA protects children by requiring the operator
of any web site or online service directed to children "(i) to provide
notice on the web site of what information is collected from
children by the operator, how the operator uses such information,
and the operator's disclosure practices for such information; and (ii)
to obtain verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, or
disclosure of personal information from children." '339
333. See id.
334. Pub. L. No. 105-277; 12 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 -
6506 (2001)). See, e.g., Laurel Jamtgaard, Big Bird Meets Big Brother: A Look at
the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 385 (2000); Dorothy A. Hertzel, Note, Don't Talk to Strangers:
An Analysis of Government and Industry Efforts to Protect a Child's Privacy
Online, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 429 (2000). However, some parents are not aware of
COPPA. See Karen J. Bannan, Parents Remain Unclear on Online Privacy Law,
N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB (May 12, 2000), http://searchl.nytimes.comlsearch/daily
/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+11362+2+wAAA+bannan (last visited
Aug. 10, 2000).
335. See Hertzel, supra note 334. See also Jamtgaard, supra note 334, at 388
(noting that non-profit and personal home pages with "guest books" are excluded
from the Act).
336. See Hertzel, supra note 334, at 436-37 (citing a 1998 FTC study of 212
children's web sites of which eighty-eight percent collected personal data about the
children).
337. See id. at 435. Some web sites enticed children to provide information
during games, contests or through chats with animated characters. See id. COPPA
now limits the amount of personal information that web sites may solicit from
children during games or contests. See Jamtgaard, supra note 334, at 389.
338. See Hertzel, supra note 334, at 434.
339. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(a)(i)(ii) (2001). See Jamtgaard, supra note 334, at
396-98 (detailing the forms of "verifiable parental consent," including fax,
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The ACLU and other plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
of a similar Act, the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), on
First Amendment grounds. COPA was designed to prevent minors
from receiving inappropriate information over the Internet. The
district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of the
plaintiffs.34 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting a preliminary
injunction.41 The Acting Solicitor General, on behalf of the United
States Attorney General, petitioned for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals.4 ' The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 21, 2001. 343
Subsequently, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on
November 28, 2001, but no decision has been handed down as of
this writing.
B. Freedom from Unwanted Governmental Intrusion
Like private companies "profiling" users on the Internet, the
government can track individual's cyberspace movements and tap
into their e-mail and bulletin board postings. 44 For many, this poses
an even greater threat to privacy and autonomy.45 Statistics show
people are even fearful of government regulations designed to
protect their personal identifiable information from private
346
parties.
However, unlike private companies' activities, the United
States Constitution protects an individual's privacy from intrusion
by the government.47 Moreover, in the landmark case Griswold v.
telephone, credit card, or even a digital certificate).
340. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
341. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating "We will affirm
the District Court's grant of a preliminary injunction because we are confident that
the ACLU's attack on COPA's constitutionality is likely to succeed on the
merits.").
342. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532 U.S. 1037 (2001).
343. See id.
344. See Ira Glasser, The Internet and the Law: Protecting a New Paradigm:
Protecting Free Speech and Privacy in the Virtual World of Cyberspace, 23 NOVA L.
REV. 625, 648-49 (1998).
345. See id.
346. See Belgum, supra note 298, 5 n.8 (citing a study by Direct Marketing
Association which found people were wary of government regulation of personal
identifiable information over the Internet).
347. See Dorney, supra note 314 (noting that Americans enjoy such privacy




Connecticut,348 the Supreme Court recognized "zones of privacy"
within the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments.349 Later, Congress ensured that the government
agencies would not compromise an individual's personal data by
enacting the Privacy Act of 1974.350
Even with these Constitutional and legislative protections, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized areas in which
governmental agencies can monitor or "tap" into a person's
communications, even from home.351 Historically, the government
used telephone wiretaps to gather evidence of criminal activity.
352
Now the focus is on the government's access to the Internet, e-mail,
and other emerging communication technologies.353
In particular, the government's crime-fighting tool,
"Carnivore" has raised serious privacy concerns. Carnivore is the
name given to the FBI's e-mail reviewing software program.354 The
Carnivore system is attached to an Internet Service Provider's
network and searches through all of its customers' electronic
messages (including e-mail, web addresses and instant messages)
looking for the messages of a person suspected of a crime.5 A
major criticism of the system, however, is that only the FBI knows
how it works.356
348. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
349. See id. at 484.
350. Pub. L. No. 93-579; 88 Stat. 1896, (1974) (codified as 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(2001));. see Dorney, supra note 314, at 645-46 (noting that government agencies
are permitted to gather only personal information that is necessary for that
agency's business).
351. See Glasser, supra note 344 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1927) (allowing unrestricted government wire taps) and Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a proper warrant must precede a wire tap).
352. See id.; Christopher E. Torkelson, Comment, The Clipper Chip: How Key
Escrow Threatens to Undermine the Fourth Amendment, 25 SETON HALL L. REv.
1142, 1154-55 (1995).
353. See Torkelson, supra note 352 (analyzing the Clipper Chip technology and
its threat to personal privacy).
354. See Congress Probes F.B.L E-Mail Snooping Device, N.Y. TIMES ON THE
WEB (July 25, 2000), http://search3.nytimes.com/search/daily/bin/fastweb?Getdoc
+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+12447+2+wAAA+Carnivore (last visited Aug. 10, 2000)
(highlighting testimony about the software before Congress).
355. See id.
356. See id.; Reno Promises Action on Carnivore, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB (Aug
4, 2000), http://search3.nytimes.com/search/daily/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+
cyber-lib+12659+5+wAAA+Carnivore (last visited Aug. 10, 2000) (assuring critics
that Carnivore's technology will be reviewed by a select number of experts outside
the FBI).
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Carnivore has also heated up the debate in Washington over
privacy in general.357 The Carnivore controversy has brought to
light the disparity between privacy laws applicable to tapping phone
communications and those that apply to e-mail.358 A phone tap
requires only a warrant showing probable cause, while an e-mail tap
requires clear and convincing evidence that the subject of the
proposed tap has committed a crime."'
C. Employee Privacy
Employees are subject to electronic surveillance to an extent
not easily discernible.3" Concrete statistics on the number of
employers who electronically monitor their employees are difficult
to achieve because, by its very nature, most electronic surveillance
is undisclosed.36' Increasingly, the monitoring of an employee's e-
mail or Internet activities has become an employer's best
reconnaissance technique.
The Internet and more advanced computer networks now
allow an employer to monitor all of her employees' e-mail,
computer files, and Internet activities from a single central
computer.3 63 For example, an employer using a proxy server" can
discover whether an employee has visited a specific web site, and
the number of times he has done So. In addition, using readily
available commercial software, an employer can know what files an
employee has downloaded, which chat rooms he has visited, what
357. See Carl S. Kaplan, Privacy Plan Likely to Kick Off Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2000, at B10, available at http://www.nytimes.comlibrary/tech/00/08/cyber
/cyberlaw /04law.html (last visited May 10, 2001).
358. See id.
359. See id. (noting that much of the debate turns on whether the Cable TV
Communications Act of 1984 applies to cable-based e-mail messages). The FCC
may resolve the issue soon. See id.
360. See generally Patrick Boyd, Tipping the Balance of Power: Employer
Intrusion on Employee Privacy Through Technological Innovation, 14 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 181 (1999); Rod Dixon, With Nowhere to Hide: Workers are
Scrambling for Privacy in the Digital Age, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (1999); S.
Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring
in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825 (1998).
361. Compare Dixon, supra note 360, 51, with Boyd, supra note 360, at 196
(citing very different statistics on employer surveillance of employees). See also
Dixon, supra note 360, $ 15 n.41.
362. See Wilborn, supra note 360, at 836.
363. See Dixon, supra note 360, 28.
364. See id. (explaining that a proxy server acts as a buffer between an
employee's computer and the Internet thereby recording the Internet address of
each web site as referenced by an employee).
365. See id. 29.
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Internet e-mail he has received, and where he stored that data on
his work computer's hard drive." Moreover, technology permits an
employer to count the number of keystrokes an employee makes in
an hour.367
Employers seek to monitor employee's computer activities for
a variety of reasons: security concerns, employee efficiency and
productivity, misuse of company resources for personal purposes,
and uncovering wrongdoing.36 Because of the respondeat superior
doctrine, employers clearly have an interest in limiting their liability
for employee misconduct committed through the Internet or e-mail,
including sexual harassment, defamation, copyright infringement,
and discrimination.369
As with other areas of privacy law, there is no omnibus federal
statute protecting employees from electronic surveillance at work.
Even the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, which
was drafted to help control employer surveillance, has fallen well
short of expectations because of large loopholes in the law.37'
Further complicating the issue is the public/private distinction with
respect to privacy rights.372 While government employees benefit
from greater privacy protections, private employees, who make up
the bulk of the workforce, have less legal ground on which to stand.
It has been proposed that Congress enact legislation that would:
(1) adapt to new technologies; (2) discourage employer action
366. See id.
367. See id, 51 n.140.
368. See id., 1 32-33; Wilborn, supra note 360, at 836-37.
369. See id., 34-36 (noting an employer's interest in safeguarding against
trade secret disclosure).
370. See id., T 60 (calling for an end to unwarranted and surreptitious employee
monitoring); Wilborn, supra note 360 (seeking comprehensive federal legislation
that better balances an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy with that of
an employer's concern for security and productivity).
371. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1872 (1986) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1367
(2001)). See Boyd, supra note 360, at 198; Dorney, supra note 314, at 643-44
(noting that while employers generally may not randomly monitor employees, they
may use surveillance, including intercepting e-mail messages, incident to business
activities or the protection of the employer's rights or property); Wilborn, supra
note 360, at 839-41 (addressing the exceptions to the Act).
372. See Wilborn, supra note 360. "Ironically, by failing to impose
constitutional privacy notions on private employers, a majority of American
employees receive little to no protection for their reasonable expectations of
privacy." Id. at 874. Wilborn also repeatedly cites the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion), where the Court
recognized public sector employees' "reasonable expectation of privacy in their
place of work." 480 U.S. at 717.
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designed to evade or "work around" the law; and (3) consider an
373employee's reasonable expectation of privacy.
VIII. Securities and the Internet
A security is defined broadly to include stocks, bonds, notes,
certificates of interest, and investment contracts.374 Federal and
state laws regulate securities, though state laws vary widely.3 75 The
federal laws affecting securities are designed to encourage market
transactions while: (1) ensuring individual investors receive full
disclosure of important facts and (2) protecting individual investors
376from fraudulent activities.
The Securities Act of 1933377 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193478 are the basis for federal securities law.3 79 The Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), created by the 1934 Act, is a
quasi-judicial agency responsible for promulgating securities
regulations and monitoring market compliance.3' The 1933 Act,
also called the "Truth in Securities Act," prohibits the offer or sale
of any security through the use of the mails or any means of
interstate commerce unless a registration statement for that security
is in effect or the issuer secures an exemption from registration.381
The purpose of registration is to adequately and accurately disclose
financial and other information on which investors may judge the
merits of securities. 3" The 1933 Act prohibits fraud in all sales of
373. See Wilborn, supra note 360, at 851-53.
374. See section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (2001);
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 1.5, at 28-29 (3rd
ed. 1996) (citing that the broad definition of securities has been held by courts to
include fishing boats, earthworms, and fruit trees). See also section 3(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (2001).
375. See David M. Cielusniak, Note, You Cannot Fight What You Cannot See:
Securities Regulation on the Internet, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 612, 622-23 (1998)
(noting that the states enacted securities laws before the federal government).
State securities laws are commonly referred to as "blue sky laws." See HAZEN,
supra note 374, § 1.2 at 6 (noting that the "blue sky" label can be traced back to
Kansas securities laws).
376. See Cielusniak, supra note 375, at 624.
377, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-77(aa).
378. Id. § 78(a)-78(mm).
379. See Cielusniak, supra note 375, at 623-24 (noting that federal securities
regulation resulted from the stock market crash of 1929).
380. Before the 1934 Act creating the SEC, the FTC was the agency responsible
for overseeing securities laws. See HAZEN, supra note 374, § 1.2 at 7-8. For a
detailed examination of the SEC's structure, policies and authority, see generally
HAZEN, supra note 374.
381. 15 U.S.C. § 77(1).
382. See HAZEN, supra note 374, § 1.2 at 7.
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securities involving interstate commerce or the mails, even if the
securities are exempt from the 1933 Act's registration and
disclosure requirements. 3 Civil and criminal liability may be
imposed for violations of the 1933 Act.3"
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 deals mainly with the
secondary distribution of securities. The 1934 Act seeks to ensure
fair and orderly securities markets by establishing rules for market
operations and by prohibiting fraudulent and manipulative
practices. 5 It protects holders of all securities listed on national
exchanges, as well as holders of equity securities of companies
traded over the counter whose corporate assets exceed $1 million
and whose equity securities include a class with 500 or more
shareholders.3 6 Companies must register such securities and are
subject to the 1934 Act's periodic reporting requirements, short-
swing profits provision, tender offer provisions, and proxy
solicitation provisions."" In addition, issuers of securities, whether
registered under the 1934 Act or not, must comply with the anti-
fraud and anti-bribery provisions of the Act.3'8
To realize the benefits of electronic technology,3 9 the SEC has
provided interpretative guidance for the use of electronic media for
the delivery of information required by the federal securities laws,
defining electronic media to include audiotapes, videotapes,
facsimiles, CD-ROM, electronic mail, bulletin boards, Internet web
sites, and computer networks.39' Basically, electronic delivery must
provide notice, access, and evidence of delivery comparable to that
provided by paper delivery.39 In addition, the SEC established the
383. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q).
384. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k), (1), (q), (t), (x).
385. See HAZEN, supra note 374, § 1.2 at 8-9.
386. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)(g)(1) and Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 2 40.12g-1 (2001).
387. See HAZEN, supra note 374, § 9.1 at 407.
388. Id.
389. See, S.E.C., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF RECENT
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES ON THE SECURITIES MARKETS, http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/techrp97.htm (last visited May 10, 2001). See generally Neil D.
Schwartz, Wall Street? Where We're Going We Don't Need Wall Street: Do
Securities Regulators Stand a Chance in Cyberspace, 8 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'y 79 (1998);. Kenneth W. Brakebill, Note, The Application of Securities Laws
in Cyberspace: Jurisdictional and Regulatory Problems Posed by Internet Securities
Transactions, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1901 (1996).
390. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Exchange Act Release
No. 36,345, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3200, at 3129 n.9 (Oct. 6, 1995); Use of
Electronic Media, Exchange Act Release No. 42,728, [2000 Transfer Binder) Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,304, at 83,374-83,393 (April. 28, 2000).
391. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct.
13, 1995).
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EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval)
computer system, which performs automated collection, validation,
indexing, acceptance, and dissemination of reports required to be
filed with the SEC.39 2 EDGAR's primary purpose is to increase the
efficiency and fairness of the securities market for the benefit of
investors, corporations, and the economy by speeding up the
receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and analysis of corporate
information filed with the SEC.393 After a phase-in period, the SEC
now requires all public domestic companies to make their filings on
EDGAR, except filings exempted for hardship.3 94 EDGAR filings
are posted at the SEC's Web site twenty-four hours after the date
of filing.
A. Permitted Securities Activities Over the Internet
The rapid spread of the Internet into the sale of securities can
be explained by simple economics: unmatched speed, accessibility,
and affordability.9  In addition, Internet access continues to
expand with increasing numbers of potential investors.3" Some
issuers are raising capital online by Internet direct public offerings
("DPO"), which are made without a professional underwriter. It is
estimated that several hundred DPOs may have been offered.
For public offerings registered under the 1933 Act, the Internet
has provided a new means to disclose certain required documents
such as a prospectus. The SEC, however, requires electronic
delivery to provide notice, access, and evidence of delivery compar-
able to that provided by paper delivery.397  Thus, electronic
disclosure by way of a company's Internet web site would not
satisfy the delivery requirements under the 1933 Act unless the
investor has given prior consent to receive electronic delivery by
392. Id. at 53,458.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See Schwartz, supra note 389; Cielusniak, supra note 375 (discussing the
explosion of the Internet and its affects on and advantages for investors).
396. Schwartz, supra note 389, at 80 (citing statistics demonstrating the
increased usage of personal computers and the Internet). The author later notes
that Internet-based brokerages are also increasing. Approximately 1.3 million
investors have such accounts already amid estimates of more than fourteen million
such accounts by 2002. Id. at 87-88 (citing On-line Investing Could Hit U.S. $680
Billion, FIN. POST, Feb. 18, 1998, at 13).
397. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458, 53,
460 (Oct. 13, 1995); SEC Interpretation: Use of Electronic Media, [2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,304, 83,377 (April. 28, 2000).
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that web site or the investor has actually accessed the document on
the web site. 39'
For some companies, the registration costs of a public offering
under the 1933 Act are prohibitive.3 9  However, federal law
provides certain exemptions,4" and the Internet has made these
exemptions more accessible. Regulation A permits an issuer to
offer up to $5 million of securities in any twelve-month period
without registration, provided that the issuer files an offering
statement with the SEC's regional office prior to the sale of the
securities.1' An offering circular must also be provided to offerees
and purchasers."° Regulation A sets no restrictions regarding the
number or qualifications of investors who may purchase securities
under its provisions and permits advertising and general
solicitations. In 1995, relying on Regulation A, Spring Street
Brewing Company became the first to use the Internet to sell
securities. 03
Private offerings under Regulation D are also exempt from
registration under the 1933 Act.a' General advertising or solicit-
ation, however, is not permitted, and the securities may be
purchased by an unlimited number of "accredited investors" and by
no more than thirty-five other purchasers.4°5 For exempt private
offerings, the use of the Internet poses difficult general solicitation
issues. Unless there are methods to restrict access solely to
investors qualified to participate in a private offering, an online
offering under these exemptions likely would violate the general
398. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. at 53,461.
399. See Jonas A. Marson, Comment, Surfing the Web for Capital: The
Regulation of Internet Securities Offerings, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 281, 283 (2000) (addressing the fixed costs associated with registering
public securities).
400. See id. at 283-89 (discussing the threshold requirements to qualify for
exemption and the restrictions imposed under those exemptions).
401. SEC General Rules and Regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (2001).
See Marson, supra note 399, at 288-89 (explaining that Regulation A exemptions
are available for offerings not greater than $5 million, and permit Internet-based
solicitation and advertising). See also Cielusniak, supra note 375, at 619 (noting
that use of federal exemptions such as Regulation A may provide a shield from
federal registration requirements, but not individual state laws).
402. 17 C.F.R. § 230.253 (2001).
403. See Schwartz, supra note 389, at 85 (discussing the SEC's approval of
Spring Street's bulletin board trading system, provided certain modifications were
made); Cielusniak, supra note 375, at 618-19 (explaining that despite Spring
Street's Regulation A offering, it had to comply with the laws of 18 different states
and the District of Columbia in order to sell the securities).
404. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.06.
405. See Marson, supra note 399, at 284-85 (explaining that Rules 505 and 506
of Regulation D forbid solicitations or advertisements regarding the offering).
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solicitation restrictions. The SEC has issued letters to clarify how
these offerings can be conducted online without violating the
general solicitation restrictions. For example, the IPONet received
SEC approval for posting notice of an Internet-based, private
offering in a password-protected page of its web site accessible only
to members who had previously qualified as accredited investors.
46
For registered public offerings, the Internet has provided a new
means to disclose certain required documents such as a
prospectus.4°7  E-mail disclosure is permitted, but electronic
disclosure via a web site or bulletin board does not satisfy the
requirements of the Securities Act, unless the investor has given
prior consent to receive the documents by those means.' In
addition, the investor must have similar access to the online
document as she would have to the equivalent paper version.4°
This does not mean that an electronic document must be
immediately viewable online, but only that its retrieval cannot be
* 410more burdensome than it would be with the paper version.
Finally, a paper version of the document must be available from the
issuer in the event that an investor revokes consent, or technical
difficulties warrant its issuance "
The Internet has also affected securities regarding the limited
offering of securities during the mandatory waiting period after
filing for registration.4 2  Typically, issuers will travel with their
underwriters to various intimate meetings, known in the industry as
406. See Schwartz, supra note 389, at 85-86; Marson, supra note 399, at 284-85
(noting that IPONet would have been in violation of Regulation D's advertising
ban had IPONet not designed its web site to "qualify" investors).
407. See sources cited supra note 389.
408. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed Reg. 53,458,
53,460-61 (Oct. 13, 1995); see SEC Interpretation: Use of Electronic Media, [2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,304 (Apr. 28, 2000). See Marson,
supra note 399, at 291 (detailing the specific requirements of electronic disclosure).
But see id. at 294-95 (explaining that an issuer may receive "tacit" consent from an
investor who goes online and accesses documents that are connected by a
hyperlink). Further, such hyperlinked electronic documents are treated by the
SEC as their paper equivalents mailed in the same envelope: by viewing one, the
investor is assumed to have viewed the other. See id.
409. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. at 53,460; see
SEC Interpretation: Use of Electronic Media, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 86,304 (Apr. 28, 2000). Marson, supra note 399, at 291-93.
410. Marson, supra note 399, at 291-93. Finally, documents that must be
together, must be accessible by the same means. Id. In other words, if special
software is needed to download one of the required documents, but not the other,
the disclosure requirements may not have been adequately satisfied. Id.
411. Id. at 293.
412. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Regulating the Use of the Internet in Securities
Markets, 54 Bus. LAW. 443, 447 (1998).
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"road shows," with small groups of targeted investors who may be
interested in buying the securities after the registration becomes
effective."3 However, in 1998, the SEC approved the use of the
Internet to communicate these road shows."'
B. Fraudulent Use of the Internet
Offsetting the benefits of the Internet's speed and accessibility
is its anonymity, which enables and protects fraudulent activity.
415
Usually, by the time the fraud is uncovered, it is too late for
investors to avoid losses: the web site has vanished. In addition, the
Internet confers credibility on information;46 people tend to believe
417statements seen on the Internet. Consequently, the Internet
facilitates fraud by providing access to large numbers of people with
little time, effort, or monetary investment. As a result the Internet
has expanded the possibilities for securities fraud and created
additional challenges for recovery of money defrauded. The SEC is
responding to attempts to use the Internet to perpetrate securities
fraud through an evolving program of education, surveillance, and
litigation.
Fraudulent statements made through the Internet are typically
intended to (1) sell worthless or overvalued securities to the public
or (2) manipulate the price of securities traded in the secondary
market. One example of the first type of Internet securities fraud is
perpetrated by creating web sites that appear to be legitimate
company web sites but are really non-existent businesses. Many
of these fraudulent sites resemble those of major companies and
even include hyperlinks to regulatory agencies.419 An example of
the second type of securities fraud is the "pump and dump. 42 °
First, the defrauder enters an Internet chat room, under an assumed
name, and encourages those online to purchase X Company's stock
immediately.4 2 This is the pump. Then, while the stock price is
413. See id. at 448.
414. See id.
415. See Schwartz, supra note 389, at 81; Cielusniak, supra note 375, at 626-27.
416. See Schwartz, supra note 389, at 81-82.
417. See id.
418. See Will Morrow, Comment, Is the Internet Participating in Securities
Fraud?: Harsh Realities in the Public Domain, 72 TULANE L. REV. 2203, 2207-08
(1998); Marson, supra note 399, at 630 (noting that many of the well-worn
telemarketing scams can also be found online).
419. See Marson, supra note 399, at 630.
420. Morrow, supra note 418, at 2209. See Marson, supra note 399, at 630-32.
421. See Marson, supra note 399, at 630-32.
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artificially inflated, the defrauder sells his stock for a healthy
profit.22 This is the dump.
C. Proposed Changes
The SEC has proposed sweeping changes to existing securities
laws.4 23  The most well known change is the Aircraft Carrier
Release, so named for its very broad proposals, which would alter
Internet securities trading in several key ways.4 24  First investors
would be required to list their e-mail and web addresses on
registration documents filed with the SEC.4 25 Second, the Aircraft
Carrier Release proposes to waive any waiting periods. 26 This
would effectively open up electronic road shows to anyone, while at
the same time easing fears that hyperlinked web sites might appear
to be advertisements rather than informational.
Meanwhile, several states have passed their own Internet
securities sales legislation .4  Experts are divided on the best
method for regulating Internet securities. Some favor a strong
International approach that would provide clarity to inherent
jurisdictional issues,429 while others have called for a stronger SEC
voice, domestically.430
IX. Cyber Crime
Defining "cyber crime" or "computer crime" is elusive. 431' For
many, cyber crime is any crime committed or facilitated by a
432computer, such as murder-for-hire over the Internet. But for
others, cyber crime describes a new genre of crime that is typically
associated with expert computer hackers.4 33 However, most agree
422. See id.
42. See Marson, supra note 399, at 298.
424. Proposed Rule: The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Release No. 33-
7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (November, 13,1998). See Marson, supra note 399, at
298. (noting that the Aircraft Carrier Release was heavily influenced by
technological advances).
425. See id. at 303.
426. See id.
427. See id. at 303-08.
42& See Cielusniak, supra note 375, at 636-37.
429. See Schwartz, supra note 389.
430. See Marson, supra note 399.
431. See Michael Hatcher et al., Computer Crimes, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 397,
398-99 (1999); Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical
Approach to the Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 180 (2000).
432. See Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 398-99; Sinrod, supra note 431, at 180.
433. See Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 398-99. A hacker is a person who
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that computer crimes are best categorized, at least for purposes of
prosecution, based on whether the computer was the target or the
instrument of the crime." Determining the role that a computer
plays in any crime may be the key to determining which laws have
been broken.435
Not surprisingly, the proliferation of personal computers and
Internet accessibility has fueled a rise in cyber crime. A recent
cyber crime study found that more than half of the corporations
responding reported unauthorized access of their computers.4 36 Of
those, sixty-six percent claimed losses of more than $50,000, and
eighteen percent claimed losses in excess of $1 million.437 Further,
studies show that computer hackers438 and online fraud have hit
financial institutions especially hard.439 Even larger is the number of
cyber crime related losses that go unreported because the attack
was never detected, or because of fears that "hacking" reports
might alarm investors or customers. 4°
Examples of cyber crimes using the computer as the
instrument include the distribution of child pornography, money
laundering and illegal gambling, copyright infringement, the illegal
communication of trade secrets, and fraud involving credit cards, e-
commerce, and securities. '  Cyber crime, with computers as a
gains unauthorized access to a computer. Id. More specifically, a hacker with
criminal intent is referred to as a "cracker." See Sinrod, supra note 431, at 182-83.
See also Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 400 n.11. Finally, a split has occurred
among hackers. See Sinrod, supra note 431, at 203-04. "Old school" hackers, who
apparently adhere to certain ethical hacking standards, complain that the typically
teenaged "new school" hackers have diminished the trade and increased
awareness resulting in the promulgation of many anti-hacking statutes. See Sinrod,
supra note 431 at 203-04.
434. See Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 401 (categorizing crimes based on
whether the computer was the object, subject or instrument of the crime); Sinrod,
supra note 431, at 187-89 (delineating among computers which are targets, tools or
incidental to the offense).
435. See generally Sinrod, supra note 431.
436. See Marc S. Friedman & Kristin Bissinger (presented by Mary J.
Hildebrand), "Infojacking": Crimes on the Information Superhighway, 507
PLI/PAT 1107, 1109-10 (1998) (citing a study by WarRoom Research).
437. See id.
438. Estimates put the number of hackers at 100,000, with anywhere from 250
to 1,000 of the most elite being able to pierce most corporate security. See Sinrod,
supra note 431, at 182-83.
439. See id. at 1124 (noting that in 1995 Citibank lost $400,000 and nearly $9.6
million more to Russian hackers).
440. See Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 399.
441. See Friedman & Bissinger, supra note 436, at 1110; Sinrod, supra note 431,
at 178-79. It has been estimated that individuals may lose more than $100 million
to Internet fraud each year. See Cielusniak, supra note 375, at 627.
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target, attacks a computer's confidentiality, integrity, or availability;
examples include theft or destruction of proprietary information,
vandalism, denial of service, web site defacing and interference, and
malicious code. 2 This type of crime targets a computer system,
generally to acquire information stored on that computer system, to
control the target system without authorization or payment, or to
alter the integrity of data or interfere with the availability of the
computer or server. For example, a hacker might gain access to a
hotel reservation system to steal credit card numbers. Or a hacker
may seek private information about another individual to extort
money or to obtain commercial advantage.
In the category of attacks known as "denial of service," the
objective is to disable the target system without necessarily gaining
access to it. For example, a common denial of service crime occurs
when an Internet Service Provider's central computer, or server, is
intentionally flooded with e-mails ("mail bombings") that "bring it
down," or freeze it."3 As a result, customers using the ISP cannot
gain access to the Internet and are thus denied service. Web site
defacing involves hackers who demonstrate their prowess by
illegally substituting their own graphics or language for what is
usually seen on a particular site." In addition, some hackers may
use the access to a web site as a vehicle to hack further into a
company's computer system where they can steal sensitive pass-
words, alter web sites, copy credit card numbers, plant damaging
programs, and create "back doors" which would allow the hacker to
re-enter the system at a later date. Finally, hackers plant malicious
codes, such as viruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses, which
infect a computer and cause damage to it without the user realizing
until it is too late."5 The irony is that often the user is responsible
for launching the virus, usually by opening an e-mail message with
an attachment."6 Worms can cause as much damage as viruses, but
442. See generally Sinrod, supra note 431.
443. See id. at 189-97 (describing at length the many techniques that hackers use
to accomplish a denial of service attack).
444. See id. at 203-15 (detailing the technical methods hackers use to attack via
web sites).
445. See id. Some hackers' aim is to gain "root access," also known as the "god
account." See id. at 205. Having root access essentially means a person has control
over the "brain" of the computer system. At that level, hackers can steal sensitive
passwords, alter web sites, copy credit card numbers, plant damaging programs
and create "back doors" which would allow the hacker to re-enter the system at a
later date. See id.
446. See Sinrod, supra note 431, at 218-19 (discussing the 1999 Melissa Virus,
launched when an e-mail attachment was opened, which caused as much as $80
million in damages).
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can launch without attaching to any other file."7 Logic bombs are
triggered by an event, or a specific time or date."8 Lastly, Trojan
horses are programs that look innocent, but behind the scenes carry
on destructive practices."9
Increasingly, prosecutors have more and better tools to bring
these criminals to justice. 50 Today, every state has laws targeting
cyber-criminals.451 Originally passed in 1984,452 and amended in
1986, 1994, and 1996, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act protects
a broad range of computers that facilitate interstate and inter-
national commerce and communications. The Act makes it a crime
with respect any computer that is used in interstate commerce or
communications (1) to access or damage it, without authorization;
(2) to access it with the intent to commit fraud; (3) to traffic in
passwords for it; and (4) to threaten to cause damage to it with the
intent to extort money or anything of value. 53 Furthermore,
depending on the details of the crime, cyber criminals may also be
prosecuted under other federal laws, such as copyright, mail fraud,
or wire fraud laws.
447. See Sinrod, supra note 431, at 221. The most famous worm was developed
in 1988 by a graduate student at Cornell University who wanted to expose the
security flaws in university and government computers. See Friedman & Bissinger,
supra note 436, at 1113-14; Sinrod, supra note 431, at 222. Though Robert Morris
never intended his "worm" to cause the extensive national damage it did, he was
sentenced to three years probation, 400 hours of community service and $10,500 in
fines. See Friedman & Bissinger, supra note 436, 1114.
448. See Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 401 n.18 (noting that while used by
hackers for destructive means, logic bombs have been employed by software
companies protecting against copyright infringement).
449. See Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 401 n.17; Sinrod, supra note 431, at
223.
450. The Department of Justice and the FBI each have units dedicated to
Cyber-crimes. See Friedman & Bissinger, supra note 436, at 1132. The FBI has a
computer crime team all 56 field offices. See Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 420-
21 (noting that the FBI has focused attention on fighting the proliferation and
distribution of online child pornography). In addition, since 1998 the Justice
Department, Defense Department and FBI have been collaborating with private
industry to form the National Infrastructure Protection Center which is dedicated
to enforcing existing computer laws and investigating future threats. See Hatcher
et al., supra note 431, at 422.
451. See Hatcher et al., supra note 431, at 425-27. The author noted that at the
time of publication Vermont was the only state not to have passed computer crime
legislation. See id. at 425. Since that time Vermont has enacted a computer crime
law. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4101-07 (1999).
452. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (1984).
453. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2001). See Sinrod, supra note 431, at 226-29.
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X. Conclusion
This article covered the areas of the law that have been most
significantly affected by e-commerce and the evolution of the
Internet: defamation, intellectual property, contract and sales law,
privacy, securities regulation, and cyber crime. This article also
identified the most significant types of legal and regulatory issues
that have arisen or are likely to arise. This article described the
extent to which the law has responded or is in the process of
responding. Consequently, this article will help business people
and lawyers better deal with the considerable uncertainty and
numerous opportunities for abuse in cyberspace.

